Submarine warfare, fiction or reality? by Cheska, John Charles
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1962
Submarine warfare, fiction or reality?
John Charles Cheska
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Cheska, John Charles, "Submarine warfare, fiction or reality?" (1962). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 1392.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1392

bmbb ittmtL a zia a musv
John C. Chaaka, Jr.
A.B. Aaharat Collag*
ThMis subnlttwi to tho Graduate Faculty
in partial fulfillment of tha requlraaanta












I Command Structure and Policy 1
II Material
III Operations 28
I? The Submarine War ae the Public Saw It









3 Effects of Strategic Bombing on Late Model
U-Boat Productions and Operations
78
4 U-Boats Sunk Off the United States Coaat
by United States Forces
79
5 U-Boats Sunk in Middle American Zone
inr United StatM ?bkii
80
6 U-Bosta Sunk Off South America
by United States Forces
81
7 U-Boats Sunk in the Atlantio in Area A 82
1 U-Boats Sunk in the Atlentio in Area B 84
9A U-Boats Sunk Off European Coast
by United States Forces
87





10 U-Boats Sunk by Strategic Bombing 38
by United States Amy Air Foreee
11 U-Boats Sunk by United States Forces in 90
Cooperation with other Nationalities
12 Bibliography 91
LIST OF MAPS AND GRAPHS
MAP NO.
1 United States Coast Line 57
2 Middle Aaerios 59
3 South Aaerios 61
U Atlantic Ocean 63
5 Europe (North Sea, and Bay of Biscay) 65
6 Mediterranean Sea 67
GRAPH
1 Isruaber of U-Bo*ts Sunk Per Period During War 71
2 American Merchant Ship Losses 73
ril
ranvoRs
"The Battle of the Atlantis was the
dominating faotor all through the war.
Never for one moment eould we forget
that everything happening elsewhere,
on land, on sea, or in the air, ,
depended ultimately on its outcome."
- W. S. Churohill
Leyte Gulf, Midway, Coral Sea come to mind when people speak of
naval victories by the United States during World Var II. It is easy
to glorify these victories, and to forget a victory equally signifi-
cant, the victory over the U-boat in the Atlantic. Without this
accomplishment, the supply lines to the European theater of operations
could not have been maintained. "It was but one link in the chain
of forces and events that led to victory over the Axis. And it was
the central, vital link, without which the chain would have fallen
into two dangling parts, shackled only at eaoh end, neither strong
2
enough to resist disaster and defeat.'* Although the operations
against the U-boats in World War II are little known today, in
January of 19A2 they were of vitsl importance.
The meeting of the U-boat threat in the Atlantic meant a step
towards the defeat of Germany. In order to defeat the U-boat, the
United States utilised her military forces, sciences, industry, and
the universities. The Navy had to initiate a new military coordinating
body, the Tenth Fleet. To bring industry and the universities together
to produce improved and new weapons, the National Defense Research
1. Roskill, S. W., The War at Sea . London, I960, Vol. Ill, I, p. 2A5.
Hereafter cited as Roskill, War at Sea , III, I.
2. Morison, S. £., The Atlantic Battle Won - Boston, 1956, Vol. X, p. 3.
Hereafter cited as Morison, Atlantic Battle Won .
viii
Committee was initiated. Although fighting a naval battle in the
Pecifio, the United States had to defeat the improved U-boat in the
Atlantic.
A complete description of the U-boat battle in the Atlantic is not
necessary, for this has already been done by Samuel E. Morison, Vioe
Admiral Ruge, and others. What is lacking is an aoourate account of
the number of U-boats the United States sunk. There have been many different
accounts given to describe these successes. The question that is raised
is the aoouraoy of these figures, which were published during the war,
immediately after the war, and those available now.
Although the Atlantic Battle will not be described ss s whole,
some information, such as command structure, policy, and materia^ will be
presented to put the data in perspective. Where the United States and
Great Britain worked jointly ©r when British policy influenced American
policy, the British policies will be described.
Major emphasis is placed upon the United States public information
policy and whether or not it concurred with the actual battle reports.
In evaluating United States policy the British public information policy
is used for comparison^ and also to illustrate its influence upon United
States policy. The public had to rely upon the government for its infor-
mation. Did the United States government accurately inform the public
about the U-boat war in the Atlantic?
The U-boat was defeated. Unlike the Pacific naval battles, suoh as
Leyte Gulf, Midway, and Coral Sea, the details of the Atlantic battle
have not been clearly described. Why was the U-boat defeated? How
was it defeated? What was the score for the American successes
Li
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1I. COMMAND STRUCTURE AND POLICY
"Their goal was the enemies'
seaborne commerce end not the
enemy fleet. 1-"
- Eric Raeder
"Maintain the lines of communica-
tion to Great Britain and also
future bases.
- Ernest King
The Command Structures and Policies of the opposing navies
determined the nature of the struggle under the sea and therefore
are vitally significant. The description of the German and United
States Naval structures will not attempt to touch upon all the
complex organisations but will give those that are pertinent to the
U-boat war. This study should include the organisation of the
navies at the start of the war, any reorganisational changes, or
any organisational additions. The personnel occupying the key
positions in the naval structures should also be mentioned. The
British organisation will only include the liaison committees between
the United States and Great Britain. In this study both the theoreti-
cal structures and the practical working models should be pointed out.
Theoretically, the German military machine had as its leader,
the Fuehrer, with the Armed Force Headquarters, commonly designated
as OKW, as the strategic control body directing the armed forces as
a whole. Each of the major services, Air Force, Army, and Navy had
3
representatives on the CKW staff. Under the OKW were the headquarters
1. Raeder, E«, Struggle for the Sea . London, 1959, p. 345. Hereafter
cited as Raeder, Struggle for the Sea .
2. King, E. J., United States Navy at War. 1941-1945. Washington,
1946, p. 818. Hereafter cited as King, U.S. Navy at War .
3. Taylor, Tillford, Sword and Swastika . New York, 1952, p. 100-105.
Hereafter cited as Taylor, Sword and Swastika.
2of the Individual services (Navel High Command). The command agency
for the Navy was OKM. General Admiral Raeder held the position of
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from June 1, 1935 to January 30, 194.3.
Prom January 30, 1943 to May 2, 1945, Admiral Doeniti held this position.
When Admiral Doenita took over his new duties as the head of the govern-
ment, Admiral von Friedeburp became Commander-in-Chief from May 2,
1945 to May 23, 1945. These are the men who led the German Wavy during
the war.
The Naval Operations Command, SKI., controlled the operations of
the Nsvy. The Chief-of-Staff of SKL from November 1, 1°38, to June 10,
7941, was Admiral Schni*wind. Admiral Schniewind was succeeded by
Admiral Frieke on June 11, 1941. Admirsl Fricke's term lasted until
February 20, 1943. Admiral. Meisel succeeded Fricke on February 2, 1943
and held the post until April 30, 1944. On May 1, 1944, the Chief-of-Staff
of SKL was changed to the Chief of Naval Operations. (Der Chief der
Seekriegslutung). Admiral Meisel oontinued in this capacity until
May 22, 1945.
The senior submarine officer was Admirsl Doenitt. Admiral Doenita
was Leader of Submarines from January 1936 to September 11, 1941.^ From
September 12, 1941 to Msy 1, 1945, Doenita held the position of
Commander of Submarines (Befchlshsber der TJnterseeboote), s change
of status which reflected the increasing importance of the sub-
marine in Germany's naval effort. Thus, from the first, the command
of the submarine fleet was in the hands of Admiral Doenitt. From
February 1, 1943, much of the task of conducting the submarine
l~. Von Seigles, F. F., Die Hohern Deinststellen Der Deutschen Wllsmacht .
1933-1945
.
Munchen, 1953, p. 55. Hereafter citeu as Siegles,
Die Hohern
.
3war was passed to Admiral von Friedeburg as Admiral of Submarines. This
occurred when Admiral Doenitz became Commander-in-Chief of the German
Navy, without relinquishing his previous functions.
The U-boat fleet was organised into flotillas. There were approxi-
mately eighteen fighting flotillas. There were several more flotillas
5for the training of officers and men. Several flotillas were also used
for the purposes of testing new equipment.
Naval Commands were also set up to govern various areas. These
Nsval Commands originally consisted of Command West and Command North
Sea. As new territories were conquered, additional Navel Commands were
necessary. Command Norway was organised on April 10, 1940, and Command
6
I 1 -..-a x -1 v.-: . *. r Pubs 20 1940. 'asss were, bhs commands
involved in the submarine war with the Western Allies. Through them
the SKL directed the U-boat activities.
Ranged against Doenits and his staff were the anti-submarine commands
of Britain and the United States, of which only the latter is relevant.
From the start of hostilities in Europe, the United States began to
organize for war. The United States Navy Department was placed under
the control of Frank Knox in June, 1940. At this time, the office of
Under Secretary of the Navy was created, with James V. Forrestal as
the first incumbent. Admiral Harold R. Stark held the position of Chief
of Naval Operations. Admiral King became Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
Fleet on February 1, 1940, or in naval terminology Cinclant. Admiral
King became Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet (Comieh) on December 20,
1941. The position of Chief of Naval Operations was given to Admiral
5~. Lohmann and Hildebrand, Die Deutsohe Kriegsmarine 1939-1945 . Bad Nauheim,
1956, Vol. I, Chap. 71, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Lohmann and Hildebrand,
Die Deutsche .
6. Siegles, Die Hohern . p. 61.
7. Morison, S. E., The Battle of the Atlantic . Boston, 1947, Vol. I, p. 115.
Hereafter cited as Morison, Battle of the Atlantic.
King In mid-March 1942. Admiral Stark was appointed Commander United
States Naval Forces Europe (Comnarere) on January 1, 1942. Vice Admiral
Ingersoll became Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet.
Admiral Sing as Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet and Admiral Ingersoll
as Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet were confronted with the necessity
of eliminating the U-boat. Several sections of Admiral King' s staff
were incorporated to direct the anti-submarine operations. Rear Admiral
R. S. Edwards wes in oharge of anti-submarine problems and coordinating
the various staff sections, especially convoy and routing, headed by
Admiral Metcalf
.
Captain Wilder D. Baker was in charge of anti-submarine
m
tactics and preparations. Admiral Stark started various defensive
sections, called Sea Frontiers, each extending 200 miles into the Atlantic.
The Eastern Frontier was commanded by Admiral Andrews, later succeeded by
Vice Admiral Leary. The Gulf >one was originally commanded by Admiral
Hunroe, who was succeeded by Admiral Anderson. The Caribbean sone had
Admiral Cook, then Admiral Giffin in charge. The Panama Frontier was
run by Admiral Train, who was followed by Admiral Kingman. Expansion
of the Frontiers resulted in the Moroccan Frontier, with Commanore McCandlish
as senior officer.
In October 1942, the Army formed the Army Air Force Anti-Submarine
Command (AAFAC) to complement the bombing of the RAF and the Eighth Air
Force. Its headquarters were situated in New York City. The unit con-
o
sisted of two wings, the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth. Thus, the
Army was also working to defeat the U-boat.
8. King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King . New York, 1952, p. 450.
Hereafter cited as King and Whitehall, floral King .
9. Craven and Cate, The Armv Air Forces . World War II, Chicago, 1949,
Vol. II, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Craven and Cate. AAF. WW II .
5Ob May 20, 1943, the Fleet without e •hip," hots appropriately
termed the Tenth Fleet, was Inaugurated to help expedite the fight
against the U-boat threat.10 Admiral King, along with hia many other
duties, became Commander Tenth Fleet. Admiral Low becane hia chief
of steff. The Tenth Fleet waa broken down Into five divisions. These
divisions included the Operatione Division, Anti-Submarine Measures
Division, including the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operational Research
Group, the Civilian Scientific Council, and the Air Anti-Submarine
Development Unit Atlantic Fleet (Airasdivlent). 11 The Convoy and
Routing Diviaion was taken over intect from Cominch headquarters.
Thus, with the introduction of the Tenth Fleet the United States Navy
was at laat organised to prosecute the war againet the U-bcat in a
methodical manner.
In view of theae operations in the same waters, the United Statea
Navy and the Royal Navy had to keep each other well informed on policy,
intelligence, and operations. Therefore, liaison committees were created.
Captain L. Hewlett Thebaud, United States Naval Control Officer at
12
Londonderry, Ireland, had initially this task for the United Statea.
At the Caaablanca Conference on January 19, 1943 . the first improvements
in organisation appeared with the establishment of the Allied Anti-Submerine
Survey Board on March 8. Although not exectly lleison, it did prepare for
cooperation between the two navies. Rear Admiral Kauffmen preaidea, with
the other United States member being Commander John Vest.13 The British
members were Rear Admiral Mansfield and Group Captain Canning (RAF).
10. Kinf and Whitehall, FJee' AdrnJ^aJLJUait P» &2.
11. Morieon, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 24,
12. Ibid., p. 12.
13. Ibid., p. 12
6This Committee was to 'Bake a survsy of all matters relating to snti-
submerine warfare In tha Atlantic OceesV ^
Another organiaetlon developed at thla tine was the Combined Procedures
Board. The American representative waa Captain Vest. Thla board* a duty
waa to aevise a single ayatem of procedures end eignsls for the navies
engaged in warfare againat the U-boat. The board nst in June, 1943 , but
could not corns to any conclusions. Therefore, the United States end
Crest Britain went on to develop their own systems and policies for defeeting
the U-boat snd countering German nsvsl policy which governed the U-bost. 1^
All the German Nsvsl Commands had to look to the Commander-in-chief,
end SKL for instructions relating to opsrstions within the command areas.
A small circls in SKL, directed by Genersl Admirsl Reeder and later
Admiral Dosnlts, made the decisions. Their policy-making group included
Admirsl Schniewind, Admiral Fricke, Frigetenkepi tan Wagner, and the head
of Reader' a paraonal ataff, Fregetenkspitsn Sehulte-Monting.l
0
Theae men
were involved in advialng the Fuehrer, on what policies and dscisions should
be made. SKL recommended policy, Hitler determined it, both before and
after the outbreak of war.
There appears to have been s significant neglect of naval affairs in
Hitler' a pre-war policies. Hitler's policy appears to recognise the British
supremacy at ass. Therefore, Germany should rssoh sn alliance with Great
Brltsin, allowing Germany freedom of action elsewhere. In 1924, Hitler,
criticising German policy toward England in 19H, showed this fsvoritism
for England. " 'No sacrifice should have been too greet to win England's
favour."'
17
In 1933, Hitler lsid down his initisl dictum. "'The bssis
U~.~Ib43
. , p. 12.
15. See Appendix I for British Orgsnisstions.
16. Bskker, CD., Defeat at Sea r Nsw York, 1955, p. 73. Hereeftsr citsd
ee Bskker, Pefest at Sag.
17. Hinaley, F. H., Hitler' Strategy. Cembridge, 1951. p. Hereefter
cited as Hinsley, HJ^sr's Strs*fgy.
7for future German navel policy, according to Reader, " 'was hla strong
dsterminstion to live in peace with Italy, Japan, and England.'"™ In
1935, Hitler sttsmptsd to plaaae England by negotiating the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement, with the naval proportion of 35s 100 in favor of Great
Britain. A stipulation was alao aade that Germany could equal British
submarine construction. Hitler had at thie tine alao aettled the queation
of the type of fleet Germany should have, choceing the balanced fleet.
Only after the Munich Agreement in the autumn of 1938, according to
Reader, did Hitler feel the realetanoe of England, and ordered a tremendous
construction progress, Alao at this tine Hitler decided to step up U-boat
19
construction from s ratio of 45? of British construction to IOCS
With Hitler's asaurance that there would be no war with England until
1944 or 1945, Admiral Raeder in September, 1938, drew up the " V plan for
20
future naval construction. With the detea 1^44 and 1945 in mind, the
plan called for a balanced fleet. Six heavy bet tlaships, ei^ht heavy
cruisers, seventeen licht cruisers, four aircraft carriers , and 221 U-boats
ware to be completed by 1948. With this balanced fleet attacks could be
carried out against British merchant shipping, the British heavy forcea
diaparaed in defenae of trade could be attacked, and the British Home
Fleet could be tied down.
21
With the turn of political events because of the attack on Poland
on September 1, 1939, the '«2J» plan had to be scrapped. The beat policy
under the new circumstances was to attack the Britlah supply lines.
Admiral Raeder, generally considered an advocate of the High Seas Fleet,
atated part of the German Navel Policy on September 3, 1939. Harrying
the enemies' merchant navy, and the most promising weapon for that purpose
18. Ibid..1)76.
19. Ibid., p. 7.
20. Msrtisnssen, Hit1st snd "jiff &da,lrefte, New York 1940, p. 13. Hereefter
cited as Martienssen, Admirals .
21. Hineley, Mtley's PlOTfrgT. P« 2.
3is the U-boat. What we need are U-boats and atill sere U-boats
On September I, 1939, in a memorandum to Admiral Reeder, Admiral Doenits
stated The U-boat is the only way of defeating Britain. The U-boat
vill always be the backbone of the fleet against England and of political
23pressure on her/ However, German policy did not solely rely on the
U-boat, but rather the primary objective of the nary was to operate
against the supply lines of the enemy. Greet Britain had to import
2L
50,000,000 tons of supplies annually. The German Mary wished to prevent
part of these supplies from reaching their destination.
To aeeomplish this end, the objective of the Navy was to avoid major
actions and to concentrate on merchant shipping. The overall plan called
for an attack on Allied merchantmen by groups of pocket battleships, light
cruisers, and U-boats. The super bettleehipe, which were better built then
the British battleships according to Admiral Reader, with superior epeed
end renge, would support the operetlon. They would engage the enemy, if
neoeaeery, until the raiding force had retired. Therefore, the ettecka
on aupply lines were theoretically to be carried out by the fleet. However,
with some notsble except ione, the task in aotuel practice devolved upon
the U-boat.
Up until December,, 1941, German naval policy continued to be attacks
on the sea lanee by U-boats and the High Seaa Fleet. After the entrance
of the United States into the war, German naval policy depended even more
upon the U-boat to choke the aupply lines to Greet Britain. Early in
1942, Hitler ordered the surface fleet to Norway, although Reader wished to
continue surface reide on Allied shipping. With the news on December 30
22. Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 21.
23. Hinaley, Hitler* a Strategy , p. 3.
24. Mertieneeen, Admirals , p. 13.
i.9
that the heavy cruiser, Admiral Hipper , had been damaged. Hitler decided
2*5
to deeommiasion all his heavy shipa. On January 6, 1943, Admiral Raeder
handed in bla resignation, and Admiral Doenits became Commander-in-Chief
26
of the German Navy.
Although the High Seas Fleet was not decommissioned, the U-boat was
dearly the major weapon against Allied merchantmen. Both Hitler and Doenits
27
employed the " tying up* of escort vessels . The " tying ujf concept referred
to the number of escort vessels the enemy had to employ to search for U-boats.
Therefore those Allied vessels on U-boat patrol were kept from other
activities. Admiral Doenits alao relied upon another concept, M integral
22
tonnage." The main task of the U-boat was to sink enemy tonnage without
regard to route, place, or cargo. The hope was that merchant sinkings would
keep ahead of merchant construction. Therefore, the German U-boats were
29
"to sink as much tonnage ss possible with the least losses The 'tying up*
concept and the Integral tonnage* concepts were to last until the end of
the war.
German U-boats at sea had to abide by policies which were affected by
the political situation at that particular time. By the London Pact on
Submarine Wsrfare in 1939, merchant ships could be attacked if guarded
by naval or air forces, or if the vessel were armed. Merchant shipa,
which resisted an order to atop could alao be destroyed. Similarly, if
the merchant vessel waa engaged in a naval engagement or was transporting
troops it could be destroyed. On August U, 1939, Admiral Raeder commanded
U-boats to wage warfare on merchant ships by these rules.
25. Morison, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 57.
26. Admiral Raeder' s resignation waa not accepted, be became Inspector General.
27. Moriaon, Atlantic Battle Won , p. 59.
28. Ibid. , p. 58.
29. Ibid., p. 58.
Oarun U-boat commanders found it extremely difficult to operate under
the London Pact reetrictiona. They found that Merchant veaaele were
running without lights. When the Merchant ship vaa atopped, they vould
report the poaition of the U-boat on their vireleaa aeta. Merchant veaaela
were alao being armed by the British government. Even neutrals were arming
their merchantmen. For example, U-3 was sunk by gunfire from an armed
30Swedish merchantman. Therefore, the uae of the wireless and armed
merchant ships made the etrict interpretation of the London Pact dangerous
to the safety of the U-boat.
Therefore, on September 23, 1939, Rseder ssked Hitler for permission
to attack ships sending wireless messr a giving the locetion of the U-bost.
Clearance was also asked to sink armed merchant vessels. On November 22,
1939, Admiral Header pressed Hitler fas peradsai.a to sink neutrsl ships,
especially Greek ships owned by British companies. He slso attempted to
get Hitler to declare a " Siege of England." 31 Thia would free the U-bost
from any restrictions st all.
On October U» 1939, Hitler gsve the order to fire on merchsntmsn who
used their wireless sets after being detained. Neutral ships were excluded
from these orders. In mid-October, 1939, Hitler approved the sinking of
enemy merchant vessels without warning. It was assumed thst they were armed.
On October 16, 1939, Hitler after vacillating, again gave hia permiaalon
32
to sink passenger ships in convoys. Hitler denied permission to attack
33
neutrsl ships and refused to declare e "Siege of England."-" Hitler did
not want to offend the neutrals, because of his excursion into the Low
Countries . He did not wish to offend the neutrals before he was reedy
30. Doenlts. Cerl. Ten Years snd Twenty Days . New Turk, 1959, p. 51.
Hereafter cited es Doenitz, Ten Years .
31. Hinsley, Hitler* s Strstegr . p. 33.
32. Martienasen, Admirals , p. 26.
33. Hinsley, Hitler* a Strategy, p. 33
to attack then.
On February 23, 1940, Hitler had denied permission for Admiral
Raeder to send U-boats to the Halifax area. He refused because of the
3Z.
"psychological effect on the U.S.A." However, when the United States
on September 1, 1941, began escorting convoys from Newfoundland to
Iceland, Raeder again appealed for freedom of action. " 'There is no
longer any difference between American and British ships.'" J This state-
ment came on September 11, 1941. The Fuehrer rejected this appeal but
left the door open for attacks on American shipping. There would be
no outright attacks upon United States warships or merchant ships,
even American ships in British convoys. However, Hitler compromised.
n
'I will never call a U-boat commander to account if he torpedoes an
American ship by mistake .'••^
Admiral King probably stated United States prewar policy best on
April 18, 1941* "Entrance into the Western Hemisphere is viewed as
possibly actuated by an unfriendly interest toward shipping or territory
in the Western Hemisphere."^ The lines. of demarcation started at 20°W
including all of Greenland, the Azores Islands, the whole of the Gulf of the
St. Lawrence, the Bahamas, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.
Therefore, the United States was committed to the protection of these
waters against any U-boat threat.
When the United States entered the war, two conflicting anti-U-boat
policies were brought forward. The policies revealed a major difference
between the Army and Navy. Its solution was the price of effective
defensive measures. The Army, its chief exponent being General Arnold,
34. Ibid..,"pT59.
35. Martienssen, Admirals , p. 118.
36. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy , p. 173.
37. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic , p. 14.
>2
wished to follow the British practice, like the RAF's Coastal Command.
This practice consolidated all anti-submarine aircraft under the command
of the Air Poroe. On January 14, 1942, the Navy requested the Army Air
Force to hand over two-engine and four-engine bombers to Navy crews.
General Arnold refused the request. "The AAF is to ODerate land-based
aircraft against suitable targets, wherever found ."-^ The best statement
of Army policy came from General C. W. Russell. The most important objec-
tive would be the bombing of sub pe>ns and yards with long range air coverage.
The tactic8 in regard to the submarines would be limited to harrying attacks.
On the Naval side, Admiral King held sway. He was unimpressed with
Hunter-Killer groups. He was unimpressed with the Biscay bombing and
harrying offense. The overall plsn should be one of defense, of convoy,
of B'24' s for Pewfoundland . The policy should be the protection of 7,000
miles of coastal lanes.
The disagreement came to a head with each service going their sepsrate
way. On May 20, 1943 the Tenth Fleet was formed. Its msin objectives
included the destruction of enomy submarines and the protection of shipping
along the East coast, in the Gulf, and in the Caribbean Sea. The control
of convoys, the support of anti-submarine ooerations, and the correlstion
of anti-submarine training and materisl development were among its sssigned
tasks. The Tenth Fleet would use V«ry Iiong R'ange and Long Range aircraft.
These aircraft could be commanded by the general or flag officer, either
army or navy.^
0
It was difficult to find a place for the Army Air Force
in the Tenth Fleet, since the Army wished e combined air force under an
air force officer and subject to army methods of discipline.^1
Admiral King appealed to Generel Mershsll. The Army Air Officer would
38. King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King , p. 452.
39. Ibid.., p. 452.
40. King and Whitehall, Fleat Admiral King . p. 205.
41. Moris on, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 26.
be given commend of Very Long Range and Long Range aircraft. Joint forces
10
would govern the bases. The final agreement of July 9, 1943* labeled
The Arnold, McNarney, McCain Agreement called for the Army's withdrswal
from this aspect of operations as soon as the Navy was ready. This agree-
ment integrated the command of aircraft into the Tenth Fleet. The anti-
submarine B-24's, which the Army handled, would be turned over to the Navy,
in return for Navy B-24's. The Navy would be responsible for off-shore
patrols, reconnaissance, and the protection of ehipping. The Army would
be responsible for shore bases required for defense of the Western Hemis-
phere. Long Range Navy patrol planes would be used in addition to the
fleet wings for patrol and reconnaissance. Nothing was to be done to
interfere with the command, either Army or Navy. Thus, the AAFAC died.
Overall policy was reviewed at the Casablanca Conference in January,
1943. The first Allied objective would be the bombing of factories in
Europe. The next step would be the bombing of plants In which U-boats
were assembled. The bombing of bases at Lorent and Brest would follow.
Further down the list could be found tracking of submarines at sea, and
the convoying of ships.
It can be seen that the Army wished to use Long Range aircraft to
hit factories and plants. The Navy wished to protect the convoys with
air and sea power. The overall strategy leaned more towards the use of
Long Range and strategic bombing, as can be seen at the Casablanca Conference.
President Roosevelt showed a tendency eo interfere and intervene
in the details of naval affairs. For example, he acquiesced to Admiral
Stark's and King's request for permission to use patrol boats (PC's)^
42. Craven and Cate, AAF. WWII, p. 392.
A3. Ibid., p. A09.
u•ub chasers (SC's) and dastroyer escorts ss tha best nethoda of defense
and convoy duty.^ Thia clearly ahowa Preaident Rnoaevelt'a tendency
to look after details in the naval program. With the organisation, policiee,
and peraonnel, the United Statea Navy vaa ready tr meet the challenge of
the German U-boat and German naval policies.
Hitler decided German naval policy. Hia adviaore, under the guidance
of Admiral Reader, end later Admiral Doenits, formulated the policies
.
Before the war major emphasis vaa placed upon the use of a balanced fleet,
in order to attack the aea lanes leading to Great Britain. After
December, 1941, and the failure to achieve successes with surfsee units,
German naval policy depended more upon the U-boet as the chief weapon
against the enemy. The use of the U-boat aa the major weapon againat the
Allied supply linea, presented the United Statea with the problem of
defense
.
President Roosevelt, along with General Marahall and Admiral King
conatructed the policies which would be employed againat the U-boat. The
Navy created a new coordinating body, the Tenth Fleet. The Army withdrew
from patrols, reconnaiaeance, end the protection of ehipping.^ However,
the Tenth Fleet waa engaged primarily in defense. The overall policy
incorporated in January, 1943, called for an offeneive againat factoriea,
and U-boat pens on the mainland.
The Germane developed an attack against the supply linea. The
United Statea chose to take the offenaive, instead of meeting the U-boat
in iaolated operations, and inoreaaingly aet the tone of the naval war,
at leaat on the eaatern aeaboard and ita environa.
U. Jane' a Fighting Shine 19A3-AA. New York, 1944, p. 467. Hereafter
cited aa Jane' a 1943-44 .
45. Craven and Cate, AAF. WWII , p. 409.
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II. MATERIAL
" I will show that U-boats alone can
win this war." 1
- Admiral Doenits
The battle between the U-boat and anti-submarine forces became a
battle of new weapons, location devices, and materials. The U-boat was
improved and given new arms and equipment as it met more effective resis-
tance. The Allies countered with new vessels, location devices, and weapons.
The German command then countered with new receiving devices, newer U-boats,
and new weapons. Thus, the battle of material was one of blow and counter-
blow, attack ana party.
In the discussion on the battle of material, it i3 necessary to under-
stand the characteristics of the U-boat. The U-boat was considered a flrst-
olsss torpedo carrier. It was suitable for mine laying operations, such as
the laying of mines in Chesapeake Bay. It was not suited for joint action
2
with other naval vessels. Its fighting poner is diminished when the sise
of the U-boat is increased. This fighting power is diminished because of
the time it takes to dive being increased. Siae also involves more compli-
cated mechanism to enable the U-bost to submerge. It also becomes harder
to maneuver anc navigate. Therefore, the larger the U-boat, the more
material and control problems become apparent.
The German Navy employed many types of U-boats. The U-boats with
very small displacements were usually confined to coastal waters. U-boats
of this type would include Types II A, B, C, whioh had aisplacements between
381 and 4.60 cubic meters. This type's speed above water ranged between
3
12 and 13 knots. Underwater speed ranged from 6.9 to 7 knots. Many of
1. Doenits, Ten Years, p. 37.
2. Ibid .. vTW.
3. Grb'ner, £., Die Schiffe Per Deutachen Kriegsmarine Und Luftwaffe 1939-45 .
Munchen, 1954, p. 18. Hereafter elted as Groner. Kriegsmarine .
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these, including Type II, C and D, with diaplacementa of 435 and 46O cubic
metera reapeetively ware used fnr oceanic duty aa well aa coaatal operations.
Larger U-boeta were built to engage in oceanic long diatence operatione.
The firat group in thia category waa Type VIIA with a dieplseeaent of 915
cubic metera.^ Tta speed on the aurface was aixteen knots and submerged
eight knots. Another ocean-going U-boat was Typa 1A, with a displacement
of 1,200 cubic metera.' More recent tyoes included Type VII 3, C, I), F, and
C^
2 »
ranging from 1,040 to 1,345 cubic meters. Their speed on the surface
ranged from sixteen to seventeen knots and submerged from sever, to eight
knots. All these models were propelled while on the surface by diesel
engines, and while submerged by electrical batteriea.
An invention to helo the U-boat overcome the disadvantage of anrfaclng
to recharge the batteriea waa the aehnorkel. The schnorkel conaisted of a
hollow tube which would allow 8ir to pass but not water. This hollow tube
waa a steel cylinder, twenty-six feet long. Not only would air be permitted
7
to paaa, but gaaea were exhauated through the tube. The uae of the schnorkel
hampered the location devices of the Allied forces, since the wake caused
by the sohnorkel waa hardly vi8ible to the human eye, and undetectable by
radar.
The Walter boat waa designed to run submerged for long periods of time.
The Walter boat, to be ready for production by 1943, renreaented a eloaed
type propulalon system. A eloaed type txropulaion ayatem needs little outside
aasistance, auch as air to recharge the batteriss, In order to function.
The submarine waa to be propelled by an Ingolin fuel, a conbinotion of diesel
4. Jane's Fighting Ships 19A3-4. p. 220.
5. Gr finer, Krlc. ^marine, p. 18.
6. Ibid . . p. 18.
7. Moriaon, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 317.
IP
oil with H2°2* Thu»» TyP* XVII was to us* eteut to run the Walter turbine.
8
This closed propulsion aystea helped the U-boat achieve a theoretical apeed
of twenty-five knots under water. Only eight of these U-boata were in the
experimental stage st the end of the war. It can easily be asserted thst
the aeans of propulsion of the U-boat had improved to the point thet frequent
surfacings to recharge batteries became unnecessary.
Later model U-boets incorporated a variety of propulsion systems. Only
a few of these U-boets aver became operational. The emphasis in thess newer
U-boata, Types XXI, snd XXIII, wss placed on methods of propelling the U-boat.
In June, 1943, Type XXI wss designed. The battery capacity of this sub-
marine wss three times thst of older U-boats. Ths hull wss streamlined,
enabling the U-boet to reach an underwater speed of seventeen knots.^ It
hsd s silent motor which worked on soundlessly moving belts. The propellor
a
were accurately designed so thst there would be only e slight disturbance
of the water. Therefore, this design of the propellers cut down on the
sound they gave off.
11
Orders were plsosd for 290 of this type, to be
built by Mereh 1, 1945. In April of 1945, U-2511, the first Type XXI
appeared. Of the original 290, 120 were built by the end of the war, with
12
sixteen to twenty becoming operational. A smaller model of Type XXI
wae to be built with a displacement of 300 cubic metera and an underwater
apeed of seventeen knots. Two hundred end sixty of these were ordered.
The greatest achievements of these U-boets were their ability to remain
submerged for indefinite periods of time and their underwater speed.
8. Roekill, War at Sea . Ill, p. 17.
9. Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 221.
10. Huge, F., Per Seekrieg . Annepolie, Md., 1957, p. 308. Hereafter cited
as Huge, Per Seekrieg.
11. Bekker, Defest st See , p. 211.
12. Morison, Atlsntlo Battle Won , p. 62.
The German* had to protect the surfaced U-boat. In order to counter
Allied location devices, they produced their own receiving devices both
physical and electronic. The physical invention vss a helicopter, which vaa
used by ths U-boat for observational purposea. The helicopter was motorlsss,
but had a foot driven mschaniem to keep it in ths sir. It vss mads of light
metal and had s light scst. A cable was attaohed from the helicopter to
the U-boat. This csbls rssohsd a height of 300 meters. 13 This typs of
observation relied upon the human ays and binoculars.
Electronic equipment was developed to ensbls the U-boat to know whan
it hsd been detected on the surfsee by the enemies* radar. This equipment
would note or receive ths emissions from Allied radar sets. The first of
these rsosiving devices waa developed in September of 1942. The purpoae
of this set, Ms tax, was to inform ths U-boat when it had bean hit by s radar
wave. This sst opersted to receive fifty centimeter radar waves.
Aftsr heavy lossss and ths reconstruction of s Braumehs tube from a
British bomber, the Germans realised that the Allies were using 10
centimeter radar. This knowledge led to the building of s rsosiving set
to dstsct ten-centimeter radar. The development of theNexos sst took
plsce in August, 1943 •^ By this time the Allies had gone to three-centimeter
redar making the Nexos receiver useless, sines Allied radsr ssts wsrs
using s diffsrent wave length. The Germans worked on a rsosiving sst for
three centimeter radsr but could not perfect one before the war ended.
The adoption of radar by the German U-boat command waa dslayed until
August 7, 1943. This delay occurred because of the pre-eminence plseed on
s rsosiving set to counteract the Allies' radar sets.
15 The wave lengths
13. Bolts and Herbert, Science in Submarine Warfare," in Maval Inetituts
Proceedings, Annspolis, 1945, Vol. 71, p. 1258. Hsresfter cited ss Bolts
and Herbert, "Science1 }' NIP . Vol. 71
14. Ruga, Per Seekrleg . p. 97.
15. Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 93
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of the German sets did not sake use of centimeter radar, although eoae
experimentation vaa carried out along these lines in 1935.16 Mow German
aubmarinea on the eurface not only had the benefit of radar receiving eeta
but alao radar aeta.
For U-boata operating below the surface, the Germane developed a
locating device baaed upon aound tranamiasion. Thia device vaa the S gear
introduced in April of 1915. Thia apparatus would transmit a series of
solitary ticke. Each tick would radiate out and be reflected beck when it
hit en object. Prom this echo-reflection the bearing and range of veseela
on the surfsee could be indicated. The U-boat* s own course and speed were
also registered. The result wss sn outline of the course of attack the
17
enemy or U-boat would take. Therefore, the S gear allowed the U-boat
commander, like Commander Schnee in U-2511, to know what was happening
on the surface. Thia development came too late in the war to be of use.
The weapon for whloh the U-boat waa designed is the torpedo. The
development of deadly torpedoea was of essential importance, sines by this
method slone wss the U-boet effective. It waa designed for use againat
18
merchant and enemy ahipa. The acoustic torpedo would be attracted to
the sound of the propellers of the ship. A modifiestlon of the scouatic
torpedo waa the Wren (T-ll), which was sttracted to the metallic hull of
the ship. Ths Wren waa of particular use ageInst escort vessels because
of lta attraction to the hull. It could not be diverted by any noise-
making devices ,
1<?
The Wren wss in production by mid-September, 19A3.
20
A third torpedo waa the Lut, or Fat torpedo. This torpedo would sig-ssg
16. Ibid.,"~pTl02.
17. Bekker, Defeat at See , p. 93.
18. Ibid ., p. 204.
19. Ibjd.., d. 20A.
20. Thursfiald, H. G., " A levy Chronicle/ in Breesv's Maval Annual 19A1. New Iork,
19AA, P. Ac. Hereafter cited ea Thurefield, " Navy Chronicle," Braaeya.
until it hit ita target, rather than travel in a atreight Una. Tha Lut
vaa similar to tha Wren, beeauaa it was attracted to the metallic hull of
the ahip. Theae torpedoea, the Aeouatic, Wren, and Lut
, beeaae the chief
neana of deatruotlon for the U-bost beneath the aurface.
When the U-boat vaa on the aurface, it depended upon torpedoea and
anti-airoraft gone. Theae anti-aircraft guns were used for protection
21
againat aircraft. The U-boat on the aurface vaa used as a flak trap.'
An attacking aircraft would be answered by flak from the U-boat. By May,
1913, in reeponee to heavy air attacks, U-bosts were equipped with heavier
22
anti-aircraft guns, usually 3.7 centimeter guns. (Gerlikona). The major
weapons of the U-boat remsinou the torpedoea, with anti-aircraft guns used
primarily for defensive purpoaea.
In order to protect the convoys, hunt down, and destroy the U-boats,
the United States had to employ a variety of vessels. The destroyer w»«j
the main fleet weapon, especially the Fletcher class. The Fletcher ciaea
23
accounted for a large proportion of the naval building program. Other
classes of destroyers included the Ell/son. Benson , Anderson . Geedly .
SBHlS£, Soapare, 3elXrl4ge, and ferrjgut.
The deatroyer escorts, tvo hundred of which had been ordered by 1943,
did yeoman eervice. Smaller than the deatroyer, about 1300 tons displace-
ment, they could do about twenty knots. The United Ststss adopted the
Britiah Hunt claaa design and built 1300 of them during the war.
By converting C-3 merchant bulla into aircraft carriers, the United
States Navy paved the way for the CVC building program. Woolworths.as the
21. JtugsT^BL^htriftK. P. 198*
22. Roskill, Wsr st See. Ill I, p. 255.
23. McMurtiee, F. E„ "Foreign NevieT in grassy' a Naval Anaujl. 19AA.
New York, 19U, p. 78. Hereafter oiteei mhdbxriiae\, * foreign navies
24. Jgnc'l 19e>4.« p. 473.
British celled them, or auxiliary (baby) carriers , aa the United States
called them, proved of value ea surface eecorta and in hunter-killer groups.
Theae carriers achieved a apeed of 16.5 knots and oould carry from twenty-four
to thirty fighter plsnss. The United Ststes converted the 3.8. Mormacmall
to the Long Island , for ita first auxiliary carrier.25 Other olnaaes
included the Sangamon . Kaiser , and Bogus olaas.
Aircraft oame to play a predominant role in the U-boat struggle.
The United Statea utilised land-beeed and eee-based aircraft, including
blimps. Land-baaed aircraft were broken into two groups. Very Long Range
end Long Range aircraft. Very Long Range aircraft (VLR) included the
modified Liberator and the Coronado (PBT-3). Long Range planes (LR)
included Liberators, Plying Fortrsssss (B-17's), Catalinas (PBY's),
Marina* (PBM's), Venturas (PV'a), and others. Carrier-based planes in-
cluded Grumsn Uildosts (F^ ) and Grumen Avenger torpedo bombers (TBF, )
.
However, these planes end vessels needed eld in locating and destroying
the U-boat
.
The major emphasis of the United Stetes and the Allies was the develop-
ment of material* to deteot the U-boat above end below the surface . Many
of the devices and methods used were based on physical properties such aa
sound and light, while others were based on electronic properties.
Although the theories Involving the travel of sound through wstsr were
not perfected, steps were taken eerly by the United Ststes to develop
underwater sound detection. In the period 1917-1918, the United Ststes
fitted destroyers and sub-chasers with hydrophones, which would dstsot any
25. Morlson, A^Ug BftUt Wfffl. p. 38.
26. Ibid., p. A3.
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audible noises. At the close of World War I, Langevin.a French
physicist, developed underwater detection, utilising sound waves of high
frequency. The new method was not simply a listening device, but rather
sound waves were emitted, hit an object, and the returning echo would be
measured. This method was used by the British who called it Asdic. The
British converted sound waves from electrical energy by the use of the peizo-
electric effects of quarts crystals. The Americans copied Asdic, but used
magnetostriction instead of the quarts crystal method. Magnetostriction
is " the ability of certain metals to chsnge dimensions under the influence
28
of magnetism." The methods of sound detection developed at the end of
World War I, enabled the United States to either listen for sounds made by
the vibrations of the U-boat's propeller or to receive and measure the
reflection of a sound wave from the hull of the U-boat.
Later improvements in World War II to Asdic by the United States in-
cluded the improvement in measuring devices, the determination of the effects
of varying conditions on ship noises, the study of sound in other oeeanic
areas, and the study of a ship's background noise. There was no real
change in principle from the sound devices developed at the end of World
War I. The United States coined the name sonar to indicate listening,
2Q
depth indication, echo ranging, and the location of obstacles. Thus, an
improved Jsdic proved useful in locating submerged U-boats by sound detec-
tion.
Another device, based on sound detection, was incorporated by the
British in April, 1941. This was the sonobuoy. A sonic buoy was dropped
into the wster from a merchant ship. This sonic buoy would pick up the
30
sounds of a U-boat and transmit a warning by radio. The buoy actually
27. Baxter, J. P., Scientists Against Time . Boston, 1946, p. 171. Hereafter
cited as Baxter, Scientists .
28. Jbid., p. 178.
29. IMd., p. 176
30. Ibid ., p. 182
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contained microphones eet et various depths.^1 The eonobuoy was used by
aircraft in an attempt to keep track of U-boats, Aircraft, therefore, had
a sound detection device at their disposal to contact U-boats.
Another physical location device was the Leigh light. This light was
• svi-
-o loeata U-boata wha were nw Lag ok fcha nurfaea at tigl
, Dae
Leigh light would locate, illuminate, and blind the U-boats. In May, 194.2,
Wellington bombers were equipped with this powerful search light.
Instead of sound and visual detection, electronic detection devices
made use of radio waves and radar. Radio waves of high frequencies were
used to detect the radio transmissions of the U-boats. This type of radio
direction finder, " Huff Duff/ was used in WearId War I and was carried over
32into the second war. The direction finder would plot the signals sent
by individual U-boats, wolf packs conversing with each other, or U-boats
contacting Admiral Doenits at headquarters at Lorient, France. Although
radio detection was not a World War II development, it was pressed into
service for the location of U-boate on the surface.
To locate the U-boat on the surface, raticr was developed. Radar is
33described as "radio detection and ranging Somewhat like sound waves,
<
radio waves can be produced to strike an object and the echo can be measured.
This type of radio wave is only effective above the surface of the water.
The British in 1940 revolutionised radar development by producing
resonant cavity magnetism, which would produce enough power to make redar
feasible at wave lengths less than fifty centimeters. Prior to this time,
not enough power could be consolidated to produce higher frequencies. With
this development, the antenna of the set was smaller, making redar feasible for
3l7 Bush. V "Modern Arms and Free Man . New York, 1949, p. 65. Hereafter
cited as Bush, Modern Arms.
32. Ibid., p. 63.
33. Baxter, Scientists . p. 138.
34. Ibid., p. 136.
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aircraft. This development meant that a narrow beam vaa produced. (The
MS
higher the frequency, the shorter and narrower the wave.)
Therefore, the British were the first to develop a narrow beam radar
set of ten oentimeters. This set had a greater range, compared to previous
sets. The beam was narrower, making the depree of accuracy higher. This meant
th8t the angular bearing of the D-boat. am the surface or of an aircraft in
the air, was more accurate. Two individual targets olose to one another could
"id
be distinguished. This type of set reflected less clutter from the ground,
from wave9, snd from clouds. The new ten centimeter sets, making the German
37Metox sets useless, were harder to jam because nf the narrower beam. By
June, 194.3, 6,000 sets had been delivered and installed on aircraft,
usually Liberators.
The United States, apecisliaing in airborne radar to detect surfaced
submarines, developed a raaar set to give a narrower and sharper beam than
ten centimeter radar. The wavelength was three centimeters, making the
German Nexos receiving set useless. The first contracts went to Sperry and
Weatinghouse to outfit night fighters. Sperry and Philoo equipped patrol
and torpedo bombers with the same device.'
To supplement sound or radio waves, a device was developed based upon
magnetism. In October, 1941, the Magnetic Airborne Detector was developed
for the use of aircraft in locating U-boats below the surfsee. The Magnetic
Airborne Detector relied upon the effect a submarine has on the earth's
magnetic field. Actually, the device measures or indicates when it has
passed near a magnetic body. The first American Catalina Squadron was
39
fitted with the Magnetic Airborne Detector at the beginning of 1944.
35. Ibid., p. 143.
36. Ibid., p. 144.
37. Ibid., p. 144.
38. Ibid., p. 152.
39. Roakill, War at Sea. Ill , p. 247
Thus, from either an aircraft or • blimp the submerged U-boat could be
discovered and followed
.
Aircraft equipped with s Magnetic A irborns Detector were given flares
to help track the U-boat beneath the surfsee. Specisl floet flares wsre
developed for this purpose. The flare had to be projected vertically so
that the exact spot could be marked. Otherwise, the flare would be carried
forward by the motion of the plane, lending shy of the intended position.
Therefore, s plans could follow s U-boat from the markers in the water
indlesting the U-boat •s previous positions.
Work was completed in 1942 on compressed sir projectors to project
the flare backward at a velocity substantially equal to that of the aircraft."
Therefore, the submerged U-boet could be followed and a trail narked by
flares.
After the submarine was located, means must be devised to destroy the
U-boat. Weapons developed to accomplish this tssk could be divided into
two cstegories: weapons for surfsee craft and weapons for aircraft. The
torpex depth charge, fired from Hedgehogs or Mousetraps, was essentially
s surface oraft weapon. The airplane used the depth charge, but also used
rockets. These two weapons, the torpex depth charge and the rocket, helped
eliminate the U-boat.
The torpex depth charge was placed in operation in May, 19A2. It
had a greater explosive capacity than previous depth charges, being filled
with RDX, TNT, end aluminum.^1 To achieve a better pattern, in order to
cover a larger area with depth ohargea , the Hedgehog and Mousetrap were
4(h Bsxter. floicntlsta
. p. 179.
Al. Ibid ., p. A2.
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developed in June, 1943. Both the Hedgehog and Moueetrap sprayed a pattern
of depth ehargea using spigot gun. and rockets/2 The Hedgehog contained
twenty-four charges, while the Mousetrap, used on smaller surface vessels,
had sixteen. There were two type, of Hedgehogs, the H.rk 10 art Mark 11.
Both wore equipped with twenty-four projectile. d..igneu to .tsy level when
released. The Mark 10 would disuse the depth charge, within two and a half
seconds. The Mark 11 wa. even fa.ter, about 1.8 second.. Depth charge, would,
be set to explode upon contact with an object, by a time setting, or a depth
setting/"
When the submarine
.urfaoed, it became a target for che airplane. Th.
aircraft could drop bombs, or use a newer weapon, the rocket. Aircraft
were equipped with rockets of two varieties. One was the shrapnel rocket,
which cleared the decks of the U-boat
.
U The other type of rocket was
constructed of solid lead with a shallow projectory to make possible pene-
tration of the U-boat»s hull, while the U-boat was on the surface. In
1%4, the rocket played an important part in combating the newly invigorated
U-boat offense. Avenger torpedo plane, were equipped with these rockets.
Thu., from 1944 the rooket became a valuable weapon against the surfaced
U-boat/5
Besides locating devioes and weapons, other materials were devised to
aid in the war against the U-boat. For the merchant ship, battleship gray had
been the normal color. However, during World War I this type of paint was
found to produce a gray silhouette againat a blaok sky. Although warship,
in World War I had used a daasle type painting, merchant vessels continued
42. Bush, Modern Arms , p. 65.
43. "The Hedgehog," New York Time., in Naval Institute Proceedings . Annapolis,
1945, Vol. 71, p. 519. Hereafter cited as « The Hedgehog," NIP, 71.
44. Bush, Modern Arms , p. 65.
45. Karig and Freeland, Battle Report, the Atlantic War . New York, 1946, p. 98.
Hereafter cited as Karig and Freeland, Atlantic War .
with gr.y. Thi. dassle type of printing wa8 need by merchant v.,..l, ln
World War II. Thi. painting resulted in the use of various color, and
«ig-«ag lines, rather than one aolid color. Thla dassle painting would
deceive the enemy both aa to course and direction/6
The foxer was another deception device. It was a noise
-making machine
with a speed propeller, which was towed behind a merchant .hip. The noise
from the foxer would confuse and decoy the acoustic torpedo coming from the
German U-boat. This attraction took plsoe because of the acoustio torpedoes'
attraction to the noise of the ship's propellers. Two disadvantages to the
foxer were brought forward. One was speed. The foxer could not be towed
faster than fifteen knots. The aeoond, and far more important, disadvantage
developed when the noise-making apparatus cancelled out the merchant ship's
own listening device. The merohant ship used dassle painting and the
foxer to decoy and deceive the enemy U-boats.
Both sides developed materials to detect one another. Both sides
developed weapons to defeat one another. Of importance is how the
materials were put to use. When were they employed? How were they
integrated with the tactics and techniques of operations?
46. Low, A. A., Submarines at War . New York, 19A2, p. 221. Hereafter cited
«• Low, Submarines at War .
47. Roskill, War at Sea . II, p. AO.
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III. OPERATIONS
" 'Command of the aeaa is the
indispensable basis of security,
bat whether the instrument that
commands swims, floata, or flies,
is a mere matter of detail.'*'
From the German standpoint, the firat six months of war against the
United States proved successful. These attacks against merchant ships
took place along the American coaat line, in the North Atlantic, in the
Gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean. The Germans concentrated on tankers
whose oil was vital to the Allied war effort.
However, by April, 194.2, a partial coastal convoy system waa incor-
porated, cutting down on the number of targets. The United Statea utilised
2
Asdic and the Leigh searchlight. By August, 1942, Allied aircraft detected
the U-boat on the aurface, by the use of radar. Before the end of the year
the Germans countered with a radar detection device, Metox.
By April, 194.3, after ten months of anti-submarine warfare, the
Germans had lost the initiative. The number of U-boats lost was rising.
The Allies had developed anti-submarine rsdar devices, and had overcome
the counter detection devices of the Germans. New escort carriers and
better air coverage gave the Allies an advantage.
The Allies inaugurated an offensive in the Bay of Biscay attempting
to catch the U-boat8 in transit from their bsaes in Franca. The Germans
countered with alternate route8 and air coverage. However, by July, 1943*
the German losses continued, because of 10 centimeter radar. The Germane
withdraw, biding their time until a new radar receiver, Nexoa, the wren
3
torpedo, and the schnorkel, became operational.
From September, 1943, to January, 1944, the improved U-boata again
entered the battle. However, the Alliea had also been working on new
1. Roskill. War at Sea . Ill II, p. 337.
2. Baxter, Scientists . p. 42.
3. Ruge, Per Seekrleg . p. 97.
weapons and equipment. Greater pIv coverage and better location devices
meant the withdrawal of the U-boats.^ The U-boats had to fight a delaying
action until late 1944 end 1945, whBn new types of U-boats would become
operational. The Germans were forced to fight a losing battle. Their
U-boats were delayed and never appeared in the combat scene. Had they
done so, they would have presented a challenge as great as the U-boat did
at the beginning of the war.
The situation at the beginning of World War II, which confronted the
British and eventually the American navies, because of the destructive power
of the German U-boats, was appalling. The German U-boat fleet started with
fifty-seven operational U-boats, of which twenty-six could be used for
operations In the Atlantic or other oceans. About eight or nine U-boats
could be in the Atlantic at any one time, because several were in transit
and others were undergoing repairs or being refitted. At the time of
America's entry into the war the Germans were building about 20.3 U-boats
5
a month.
Before entering the conflict, the United States engaged in operations
to insure neutrality. On Septmmber 5, 1939, the Air Neutrality Patrol was
organized. In the north Catalinas of Patrol Wing Seven were based at
strategic points such as Argentia, Newfoundland, and Reykjavik, Iceland.
In the south, Patrol Wing Three was stationed at Coco-Solo in the Canal
Zone, while in the middle, Patrol Wing Five was ststioned at Norfolk,
Virginia. 6 The United States, therefore, began protecting and patrolling
its coastal waters in 1939.
Belligerents, other then those countries which had territory in the
Western Hemisphere, were warned by the United States to keep their nsval
4. Ibid. , p. 39.
5. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic . Appendix I. r
6. Aviation History Unit, The Navy's Air War . New York, 1953, P- 40. Hereafter
cited as Aviation History, The Navy's Air War .
veaaela out. As of April 18, 1941, the Atlantic Fleet was instructed to
patrol the North Atlantic and the Caribbean Taak Force II vae responeible
for the area northeaat of Greenland.7
At the Atlentic Conference on August 10, 1941, President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill deoided that the United States should escort the
Halifax convoys across part of the Atlantic. Therefore, on September 1,
1941, ehipping between the two United States banes of Argentia and Iceland
was plsesd under United States Naval esoort. Any Allied hitch-hikers enjoyed
the benefits of United Statea naval protection. At Argentia, Newfoundland,
the Royal Canadian Navy took over, and at Iceland the Royal Navy assumed
8
control. Between Newfoundland and Iceland, the United Statea Navy waa
responsible for the protection of the convoy. Thus, the United States was
engaged in patrolling the sea lanes and protecting the convoys before wsr
On December 12, 1941, the decision was made by Hitler, in conjunction
with hie Admirals, to send twelve U-boats to the ooaat of the United States
to begin Operation Pauchenschlag. (Roll of Drums)9 Hitler, beaause of
his suspicions that the British might invade Norway, demanded that a
strong contingent of U-boats be stationed in Norwegian waters. Therefore,
the originel number of U-boata was out to six. 10
These six U-boats, plus additional arrivals, never going above twelve,
worked from January to May, 1942, off the American coast and in the
Caribbean Sea. On January 5, 1942, the U-boats ware operating off the
Gulf of St. Lawrence end Cape Ketteras. By the middle of January, 1942,
seven were operating off Newfoundland, while in March regular explorations
were made off New York Harbor. Mine-laying duties were carried out off
7. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 14.
8. Ibid ., p. 85.
9. Ro8kill, War at Sea . II, p. 94.
10. Churchill, W. S., The Hjnge of Fete . Boston, 1950, p. 111. Hereafter
cited ea Churchill, Hinge of Fete .
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Chesapeake Bay and New York Harbor, closing the ports for two and three
daya respectively.11 The U-boats, besides laying mines, lay submerged
offshore by day, and Bored inshore to attack on the surface at night with
guns or torpedoes.
By April 1, 1942, defensive measures were initiated by the United
States with s partial convoy system, some sir pstrol, and the use of
twenty-four borrowed trawlers and ten corvettes from the Royal Navy. The
partial convoy system consisted of merchant ships traveling by day and
anchoring at night in protective harbors. By Hay H, 1942, adequate pro-
tection was available so that travel from Hampton Roads to Key Meat, Florida,
Guatanamo Bay and New York, Guantanamo Bay to Puerto Rico to Trinidad,
and from Key West to the Western Gulf ports and around the Cape of Good Hope.
Thus, by May, 1942, the United States could adequately provide protection
for ooaatal convoys.
The convoy system was essentially a supply train or the reinforcement
12
column of the see. The ships of a convoy travel together as s unit with
escort vessels providing a protective acreen. Each convoy is grouped
according to speed. Therefore, convoys axisted for three speeda, 7.5, 9.5
and 10 knots.^ A convoy usually consisted of forty-five to sixty ships.
The escort commander determined the type of action to be taken. The
convoy would either eteam atraight ahead or it would sig-sag. The larger
and slower convoys had by necessity to keep a strsight course using only
mild evssive sotion. This evasive action consisted of e change of twsnty to
11. Roskill, War at Sea . II, p. 95.
12. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 12.
13. aid.., p. 12.
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fifty degrees on either aide of the basic courae. This evasive action
would lsat from two to six hours.^ The slower convoy unable to take evaaive
action was a prime target for the U-boat.
In the months of June and July, 1942, the U-boata concentrated in the
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. U-boata were elao operating in the
Middle Atlantic, taking advantage of the Greenland Air Gap. U-boata operated
in thia area because air coverage from Greenland had not been achieved.
The U-boats employed the wolfpack method of attack. The theory behind
the wolfpeck (Rudel) waa to preaent a epread pattern to thi enemy. Thia
made it difficult to run down all the leads obtained from location devices
.
Therefore, the U-boat waa used as a ship of the line.15 When sttsmpting
to locste convoys or gain position, the wolfpack was controlled by Admiral
Doenits from Lorient. When engaged in en operation, the wolfpack waa
commanded by the 8enlor officer or a control ahip.^ The wolfpack attempted
to run ahead of the convoy, surface, out-maneuver the weak eacorta, and
attack at night.
During thia period the U-boat attempted to eacape detection from Asdic.
The methods utilised by the Germans took advantage of the weaknesses of
Asdic. The U-boat would vary its depth because of the inability of Asdic
to record whether or not there waa more than one U-boat. The U-boat also
17
emitted bubbles to give the eame effect. These ohemicala, which produced
bubbles, reflected strong echoes giving the appearance of several U-boata.
U. Ibid., p. 110.
15. Internetlonal Military Tribunal. Nuremburg . Nuremberg, 19*8, Vol. XIII,
p. 414. Hereafter cited es Nuremburg . XIII.
16. Morison, Battle of the Atlantic p. 25.
17. Baxter, Scientists . p. 42.
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When an escort vessel attacked a U-boat, the escort vessel' 8 Asdic became
useless, because the vessel's Asdic could not distinguish between the
depth charge and the U-boat. Thus, the U-boat could take advantage by
varying its depth, or by calculating the depth of the depth chargea and
diving below this depth. 18
The escort vessels countered these U-boat taotlca by using sonar and
creeping tactics. Creeping tactios incorporated the use of two escort
vessels. The first escort would track the U-boat and coach the second
escort vessel, which would be attacking the U-boat. An offensive,
utilising the Leigh searchlight, was also begun against U-boats using
the Bay of Biacsy on the way to and from Prance.
Prom August, 1942, until the end of the year, the U-boats concentrated
along the North American ooast, in the North Atlantic, off Freetown,
South Africa, and off Brssilian and Venesuelan waters. Vhsn the U-boat
was caught on the surfsee beosuss of radar or the Leigh searchlight, it
chose to fight back with flak guns. However, before the end of the year
the Metox was in operating, cutting down on the number of surprise
attacks by Allied airorsft.
The United States and Great Britain used 50 centimeter radar in July,
1942, to locate U-boats on the surface. The use of radar and the Leigh
searchlight helped the Bay of Biscay offensive. However, at the end
of the year radar sightings were diminishing because of the perfection
of Metox. Thus, the Bay of Biscay offensive collapsed.
From Jsnuary to April, 1943, the U-boats operated in the North Atlantic,
18. Ibid ., p. 42.
19. Roskill, The War at Sea . Ill, I, p. 49.
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Central Atlantic, and off the northern coaat of South America. By April,
19^3, the Alliea were taking steps toward having complete air coverage,
better detecting equipment , and newer weapons. In March, Liberators were
outfitted with extra gee tanks. Therefore, Liberators stationed in Greenland
could cover the Greenland Air Gap, Tsn centimeter radar was installed on
aircraft, dsstroying ths value of Metox. Escort vessels were equipped
with the Hedgehog and Mousetrap. New auxiliary escort carriers were being
commissioned, Merchsnt ship lossss bsgsn to decline because of better air
coverage , the use of radar, and newer weapons
,
The Germane called May, 1943, "Black May."
20
The Germane loet heavily
The Alliea were using ten centimeter reder in their aircraft. The
Germane
were et first confused as to the reason for their losses.
They finally
realised thet Allied aircraft were using diffsrsnt radar wavelengths.
The
remaining U-boeta on duty were switched to the Asoree Air Gap
or to an
srss southwest of the Asores.
21
In June, the German U-boats wsre better
equipped to meet the Allied attacks. Anti-aircraft equipment
wss increased,
In September the Wren torpedo would be operational.
Again the battle
linee were redrewn.
Starting in May and continuing until December, the
battle reged in the
Bay of Biscay from the spproachee of the Atlantic
to the European coaet line.
The Allies attempted to cut the line, of transit
by use of the petrol plene.
In thie offensive, Liberator, were equipped
with ten centimeter rsdsr snd
Wellington bombers with Leigh searchlights. Cstalina
flying boat., Patrol 63.
under the command of Lieutenant Commander Edwin
0 a Wagner, were equipped with
fflu^ol^^ili^^ of H-^ i» ^d-W^n. New Haven,
194?; p. 166. Hereafter cited ss
Puleeton, Sj5a_Power.
3the Magnetic Airborne Detector (MAD). Destroyers also petrolled the
Bay and ita approaohaa.
The Germane to counter theee attacks and avoid radar detection ueed the
"Piening Route." 23 In July, U-155, commanded by Adolf Planing, proceeded
through Spaniah ooaatal watera. Radar could not pick up the U-boate beoauee
of the backdrop of the Pyreneee.
Mara hell Goerlng alao assisted Admiral Doenits with Focke-Wulfe 200' e
(boabera) carrying radio controlled glide boabare to uae againat warahipa.
German attack boabera (JU-33'a) appeared to attack the patrolling Liberators
and Sunderlands. Theae air attacks were auooeaaful enough that the Admiralty
orderea all ahipa to retire out of German air range.
The Germans could not understand the reasons for their loaaes of May
to July, 19-43. Inevitably, gueaaea included the uae of thermal waves or
the radiation of the receiving set, Metoz. A teat in the Baltio showed
that aircraft could pick up radiations from Matox at a height of 6,000 feet
and a range of 110 kilometers. Action waa taken. U-boat commanders were
told not to rely on the Metox aat. However, losses continued and eventually
the Germans put together the Brsumohe tube from a downed British bomber.
They reelised they were up againat ten centimeter radar. By August, 1943,
the Germane developed a different receiver, Nexoa, to receive the ten
centimeter radiations. The Wren and better anti-aircraft equipment were
also added at thia time.
In September and October, 1943, twenty-two U-boats were stationed
in twos and threes off Cape Farewell, Greenland. Admiral Doenita aent
this group to sea with the message t 'The Fuehrer is watching every
25
phase of your struggle, attack, fellow up, ainki'"
22. Moriaon. Atlantic Battle Won, p. 95.
23. Ibid., p. 98.
21. Ruga, Per Seekrleg. p. 97.
25. Moriaon, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 139,
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With the use of the Magnetic Airborne Detector, eonobaoye, and
rocket-equipped aircraft, the U-boata again Buffered heavy loasea from
26August to October, 1943
.
Long Range aircraft were now operating fron
Tusaira in the Asores, cutting the distance of the Asores Air Gap. On
November 12, 1943, Admiral Doenits and his staff admitted that.- "'The
air menace has curtailed the mobility of the D-boat. The enemy holds all
the trump cards. Far-reaching air cover, using location methods against
27
which we have no warning." The remaining U-boats were shunted to the
Gilbert Straits.
In January, 1944, the D-boats returned to the Western Approaches of
the Atlantic. Thirty U-boets were in the Atlantic or the approaches to
the Atlantic Twenty were located west of Iceland. Ten were situated
noitheast of the Asores in order to attack the Sierra Leone and Gibraltar
convoys. Even the Mediterranean waa reinforced. Of twenty-six U-boats
attempting passage into the Mediterranean, two were destroyed end twelve were
recalled. The remaining U-boats entered into the Mediterranean. All
these U-boats were equipped with the schnorkel, anti-aircraft equipment,
and Nexos receiving sets.
In May, 1944, only three merchant ships were sunk out of 3,600 crossing,
in s total of 105 convoys. The merchant ship losses were small because of
improved and more abundant escort vessels, air-sea escorts, three centimeter
radar, rockets, and the Magnetic Airborne Detector. By the end of May,
the Germans practically abandoned the North Atlantic, leaving only five
U-boats stationed off West Africa and three en route to the United States
.
Now United States aircraft and sea escorts were equipped with three
centimeter radar, the Magnetic Airborne De+ector, rocketa. Hedgehogs, snd
26~. Ruga, Per Seekrleg . p. 39.
27. Roskill, War at Ses . Ill II, p. 50.
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Mousetrap*. The only hop* for th* Germane was to await the tialivery of the
new U-boat*, Type* XXI or XXIII
,
equipped with the S gear. Only two
became operational with 0-2511 and U-3008 going to sea. These newer boat*
never saw action. A radio message on May 5, 0300 hours halted any
engagements. " 'A* of May 5, 0300 hour*, oeaae fire. For U-boats at aes
attach* forbidden. Break off immediately pursuit of enemy. Return to
28Norwegian harbor*, Commander-in-Chief U-boats.'"
In January, 1942, German U-boat commandera could choose their target*.
American defensive measures appeared to be negligible. Even with the
installation of a partial convoy system, German U-boat success continued
along the American coaat line. The erea of operations would change,
enabling the U-boats to operete unhampered. U-boat successes continued in
the North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. However, by
May, 1943, the Allies installed 10 centimeter radar on their aircraft,
making the German Metox set obsolete. The U-boat* awaited the development
of the Nexe* receiving eet, while the United State* was in the process
of perfecting 3 centimeter radar. In August, 1943, the U-boat again
entered the Atlantic, equipped with the schnorkel end wren torpedoes.
The Allies equipped planes with the Magnetic Airborne Detector, three
centimeter radar, and the rocket. The Germans never regained the offensive.
28. Bakkar. Defeet at Sea , p. 219.
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IV. THE SUBMARINE WAR AS THE PUBLIC SAW IT.
"Truth oruihto to earth, shall rive •gain,
Th' eternal rear* of God are hera
Out error, wounded, wither in pain
And dlea aaonf? hia worafalpera 1
Tha war that was fought at aaa vaa ra-fought in navapapers in the United
Statee. These newspapers bad to rely on government information as the major
source of supply for news on the U-boat war. Therefore, both the United States
Government and the British Goverresent attempted to give the public eeleeted
information on the U-boat theater of opcretions. It was important to the
Government that the American and British peoples know the effectiveneea of
the anti-submarine campaign and the progress that was being made. It wsa
neoeeaary for the United States Government to release newa in order to combat
the fears of the people that the U-boat war wea not progressing very well,
especially with toe news of merchant ship sinkings, such es the sinking
2
of the Combre reported on January 17, 1942. Newapsper reporta were elao
:ieodeu in oruer to combat German propepemo, such ea the German claims of
oiriin./ 924,000 tons in the month of May, 1943.' Therefore, the question
can be raises as to the official policy of the United Statee end Great Britain
towera news on the U-boat war and how this policy actually materiellsod.
The Americen policy, concerning information on the U-boat threat end anti-
submarine actions, vaa divlued into two phases . Phase One wee the perioa
from the beginning of the war to March 13, 1943. The policy in this period
was to give no Information at all. This no-information policy included
engagements with the enemy, euceeeaee against the enemy, end the eucoeeaee of




2. "New U-boat Victin Confirmed by Navy." Tha New York Times . XCI, 30, 674
(June 17, 1942). p. 1.
3. Thurelleld.,, H. C, -Chronicle of 1943* in Braaav's Naval Annual. 1943.
New York, 1943, p. 28.
39
the enemy. The attitude of the Navy was "Let ue cheer the disappearance
(of U-boats) and be contented to wait the explanation of the mystery."^
Therefore, an appeal was made by the Navy; "Every American can regard silence
and secrecy as his own personal anti-submarine weapons." 5 Naval policy
was not stagnant and was changed on March 18, 1943, by the United States
Navy Department. The United States would now make known when submarine
encounters had taken place, and what the results were. The news released
by the United States was usually a month to three months behind the actual
occurrences. These policies had an effect on how the submarine war was
reported.
The anti-submarine war was broken down into varying categories such as
areas of action, localities of specific actions, enemy losses, and Allied
losses. With regard to the areas of action, an identification of areas
where U-boats were operating, the policy permitted no information in Phase One.
When specific actions took place, the Navy would not describe the action.
President Roosevelt on January 21, 1942, defended this policy when he stated?
"To disclose definite action against the submarines would be unwise."**
In Phase Two the information ban was eased considerably, although dates and
specific location were rarely given. In Phase Two, American successes were
reported more frequently.
Merchant and naval sinkings by U-boats were not released in Phase One
until several months after the engagement. Further, on November 15, 1942,
the Navy forbade the disclosure of the names of sunken ships, whether naval
4. "Navy Strikes 'Strong Blows' as U-Boats Continue Attack," The New York
Times . XCI, 30, 678 (Jan. 21, 1942), p. 1. Hereafter cited as « Navy
Strokes 'Strong Blows'", NYT, XCI, 30, 678 (Jan. 12, 1942), p. 1.
5. "Navy Reports Victories Over Submarines," The New York Times . XCI, 30, 68J,
(Jan. 24, 1942), p. 1. Hereafter cited as " Victoria*1 , NYT, XCI, 30, 681,
(Jan. 24, 1942).
6. "Navy Strokes 'Strong Blows'", NYT, XCI, 30, 678, (January 21, 1942, p. 1.
units or merchantmen. In Phasa Two this policy was continued. This
can be seen from the questions raised by The New York Times regarding
merchant sinkings. "Why," it was asked, "conceal the fact of merchant
a
sinkings. Hitler brought the war to our doorsteps."
The overall polioy of the British government toward U-boat coverage
was to release the news at the best possible time. From the beginning
of the war until March, 1943, the British followed a no-news policy with
slight moderations. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander,
would release information at times regarding the success of British
methods. In Parliament on October 21, 1942, this release was sttaoked
by Mr. Clement Dnvies. The London Times naval correspondent described
this attack. " It constituted a change of polioy and that if such state-
ments should be published at all, they should be made in the House of
Q
Commons rather then elsewhere." Therefore, Phase One could be seen as
an attempt to keep pertinent information at a low level, but the
Admiralty was willing to release information at times.
On March 18, 1943, the curb wss lifted, allowing articles giving
information on battles occurring within s week of the reported event.
" It hss not hithsrto been the practice of the Admiralty to make publio
any details of operations versus U-boats until a period of some weeks
after they had taken pleoe."
10
The veil was lifted. This lifting of
restrictions could be considered the second phase of public releases
by the Admiralty.
7. "U-Boats Destroy Five More Ships," Th« Mew York Times. XCI, 30, 731,
(March 15, 1942), p. 1.
,
8. "The Ses War," The Hew York Times . XCII, 31, 119, (April 7, 1943), p. 24.
9. "U-Boat Sinkinge," The London Timss . 49, 380, (Oct. 30, 1942), p. 4.
10. rt Inoreesed Sinkings of U- Boats," The London Times . 49, 546, (Kay 15,
1943), p. 4.
The Admiralty attempted to formulete these polioiea to handle four
different categories of information. In Phase One and Two the policy
concerning the general locality of U-boat operations was not stringent.
When reports were given, little Information was given on the specific
locality of the engagement. Enemy losses in Phase One were not as guarded
a secret as in the United States. For example, on January 28, 1942, in
The London Times, U-433 was reported sunk by the Corvette H.M.S. Marigold.
In Phase Two, the Admiralty was willing to relesse figures on the suoeess
of the anti-submarine war more readily. The Admiralty did not release
much information on merchant shipping losses. In Phase One merchant
shipping losses were mentioned from time to time. In Phase Two, the
British in coordination with the United States would make a statement on
merchant losses.
To coordinate statements on merchant losses and U-boat sinkings,
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill began issuing reports
on the U-boat war. These statements were stsrted during Phase Two, in
October, 1943. They dealt more with the ratio of merchant ships sunk to
the number of submarines sunk, than to exact figures on merchant vessels
or U-boats sunk. For example, on December 10, 1943, it was announced
that more U-boats than Allied ships were sent to the bottom in November.
Similarly on May 10, 1944, the Joint report said that United Nations'
U
activity versus the U-boat was continuing at a highly satisfactory level.
Thus, in Phase two, the United States and Great Britain attempted to
coordinate their reports.
11. "U-Bost»s Brief Life," The London Times . 49, 263, (Jan. 28, 1942) p. 9.
12. "U-Boats Held in Check/ The New York Times . XCIII, 31, 518,
(May 10, 1944), p. 4.
In the United States, the implementation of thla policy eould be
ae,n Th« New York T|mcs. la the first phaae, general atatementa were
predominant on the success of anti-eukaarina aesauree. It was reported
that aone recent visitors would never enjoy the return trip. 13 other
releaaea would hint that an unapacified number of submarinea were
liquidated off the Atlantis Coaat. Other reporta hinted that the percentage
of one-way traffic was increaaing. On January 25, 1942, the article,
" Nary Hinta Again at the Sinking of U-boata," ^ appeared, In which it
was reported that countermeaeuree against U-boata were continuing
favorably. Exact figures on U-boat alnkinge were seldom given. One of
the few times was in April, 1942. The number of U-boata aunk by
United States Forcea was given as twenty-eight.15 These atatamenta re-
flected the press reports from January, 1942, to May, 1942 of Phase One.
From May, 1942, to the end of Phase One, enough information was
given to the press to indicate that German U-boats were being sunk. On
February 23, 1943, it was reported that a destroyer of unstated nationality
had sunk a U-boat a few miles south of Pioo Island in the Asores. Other
reports indicated that the US8 Campbell rammed a Nasi submersible, 1000
-i
miles out on the Atlantic. Thus, during the letter part of Phase One
more reports were given of German U-boat loaaea.
During Phase One, reports on merchant losses were given either in
official naval department statements or by unofficial Associated Press counts.
13. "Victories," N££, XCI, 30,681, (Jan. 24, 1942), p. 1.
14. Navy Again Hinta Sinking of U-Boeta," The Hew York Timea. XCI,
30, 682, (Jan. 25, 1942), p. 7.
15. "U. S. Pilots Get 3 U-Boata," The New fork Times. XCI, 30, 749,
(April 2, 1942), p. 1.
16. "Convoys Rout U-Boat Packs/ The Hew York Times . XCI, 30, 687,
(March 18, 1942) s p. 1.
In ths United States, the iaplsMsntstion of this policy oould be
•««n in Tht IftW Iflrt TIWW. In ths first phase, general ststsnente we
predosdnent on ths susosss of anti-aubnarine Measures. It was rsportsd
that sons rsosnt visitors would nsver snjoy ths return trip.1** Other
rslsssss would hint thot sn unspsaifisd number of sufenarinss wsrs
liquidated off ths Atlantic Coast » Other reports hintsd that the peresntsgs
of one-way traffic wss inoreasing. On January 25, 1942, ths srtiola,
Hsvy Hints Agsln at ths Sinking of U-boats," appssrsd, in which it
wss rsportsd that eountsrasssurss sgsinst U-boats ware continuing
favorably. Exact figures on U-boat sinkings wsrs ssldon given. One of
the few times was in April, 1942. Ths number of U-boate sunk by
United Stetee Forces wss given ss twenty-eight.99 Thsss statements re-
flected the press reporta from January, 1942, to Msy, 1942 of Phase One.
Proa Msy, 1942, to the end of Phsss One, enough informstlon wss
given to the press to Indicate that Gsrasn U-boats were being sunk. On
February 23, 1943, it wss rsportsd tbst s destroyer of unstated nationality
hsd sunk s U-boat a few ndlss south of Pieo laland in ths Asores. Other
reports indicated that ths USg Caapbsll rssstsd a Hssl submsrsibls, 1000
Biles out on ths AtUntie.16 Thus, during ths lsttsr part of Phsss One
acre reports were given of German U-bost losses*
During Phsss 0ns, reports on msrehsnt losses wsrs given either in
official naval dspsrtssmt statcsents or by unoffisisl Assosistsd Prsss counts.
13. "Victories,1* JSE, »I, 30,681, (Jen. 24, 1942), p. 1.
14. Hsvy Again Hints Sinking of U-Bosts," Ths Hsw York Timss. XCI,
30, 682, (Jan. 25, 1942), p. 7.
15. *U. S. Pilots Get 3 U-Bosts," Ths EfW Xgrk limps, *CI » 30. 749,
(April 2, 1942), p. 1. M
16. -Convoys Rout U-Boat Packs/ fflsi "PM Tork T1— • XC1 > 30, 687,
(Harsh 18, 1942), p. 1.
For example, on March 31, 1942, the Associated Frees reported total of
one hundred merchant sinkings, sines the beginning of hostilities. The
official count at this tiae was twenty-two merchantman sunk.17 A Bevy
spokesman on January 20, 1943, out the total merchantmen sunk at 685
18
since the beginning of the war,, Therefore, it can be aeen that reports
were presented in The Hew York Times on the ststs of U-boat and merchant-
ship loaaes in Phase One, even though a period of no information was in
effect
.
After the accelerated successes of the Allies in 1943, more informa-
tion became available. The news releases included more information on
the individual battles in the Atlantic end other operational areas. These
reports were rarely up-to-date or detailed. For example, on April 24, 1943,
a German U-boat was reported destroyed in the Caribbean by a petrol bomber,
19
» several months ago/
The policy of Phase Two wee carried out in the reports on the number
of U-boats sunk. On September 8, 1943 3 the United States reported that
in three months ; May, June, and July, twenty-nine U-boats were sunk.
Twenty-four of these twenty-nine were credited to naval units. Mr. Angus
MscDonald, Minister of National Defease for Great Britain, on March 10,
1944* gave a more precise picture of Allied success in 1943. He described
the foe's losses In 1943 aa heavy, with more than 200 German, Italian,
20
and Japanese submarines sunk. According to these sample reports, more
news on individual sinkings and the total number of U-boats sunk, was being
given.
17. "U-Boat Men Knew Ships* Cargo," Tht Ffff Xfflfr TaHTffi XCI » 3°» 7*7*
(March 31, 1942), p. 7.
18. 66 Believed Lost with British Ship/ Tht Tflf YrCfci TlTOfi XCII, 31,042,
(Jan. 20, 1943), p. 6.
19. • German Submarine Sunk In Caribbean," »hf *T¥ Xffflft Tfifltf r XCII, 31, 166,
(May 24, 1943), P. 3.
20. -roe's Losses Called Heavy/ Tht fffflf IlDt TiWt. ™u > 31, 457,
(Sept. 8, 1943,), p. 13.
uIn Phaae Two, xnerohant shipping losses were given in accord with
the agreement on Joint statements by Roosevelt and Churchill. Therefore,
statements would appear such ae Allied Ship Losses at Record Low." 21
Other statements hinted that the U-boat was becoming " the bunted rather
22
than the hunter." Thus, the policy of ccabined reports on the U-boat
war appeared during Phase Two.
The carrying out of British policy with regard to Fhaae One and Two
could be seen by examining The London Times . The policy of giving soaas
information could be seen in Phase One of the U-boat war. Mr. A. V. Alex-
ander, on October 21, 19-42, described $30 U-boata as either damaged or
sunk by Allied foroes. These figures did not include French successes
before June of 1940. Some American Mile had been included.23 Another
set of figures was given in February, 1942. This report stated that 130
U-boats had been sunk so far in the war.2^" Two often contradicting
reports by the British and Americans en Allied successes were released
In Phase One, merchant shipping losses were not as publicised as
in American newspapers. Reported merchant shipping losses in Phase One
gave very little information. On September 15, 1942, it was reported!
26
"Four merchant ships sunk/ and Hated the Ottawa and Raccoon as sunk.
On February 12, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill indicated that in the
first year of the war, every U-boat lived long enough to kill nineteen
21. "Allied Ship Losses at Record Low," The New York Times . XCIII, 31, 457,
(March 10, 1944), p. 1.
22. 500 U-Boats Sank in War," The Hew lork Times . XCIII, 31, 610,
(August 10, 1944), p. 1.
23. "The War at Sea," The London Times . 49, 372, (Oct. 21, 1942), p. 2.
24. " 130 U~Boats Sunk," The New York Times . XCI, 30, 709, (Feb. 20, 1942),
p. 3.
25. "Four Merchant Ships Sunk," The London Times. 49, 341, (Sept. 15, 1942),
p. 3.
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merchant ships. In the second year, U-boats accounted for twelvs ships
a piece, while the average dropped to seven and a half ships for the
26
third year. Thus, in Phase One the British allowed more information
on merohantshlp losses to be published.
Aftsr the veil was lifted, Th*> Lnndnq TMpyt published sore specific
dsta on the losses of U-boats. Individual engagements and sinkings were
reported sooner. For example, North Atlantic aircraft of the Coastal
Command destroyed five U-boats in ten days. ' These successes were reported
within a week of the engagement. Similar reports were announced concerning
bombing raids on enemy posts. Thus, it was announced on April 1, 1945,
that the United States Eighth Army Air Tores with 650 Liberators and
28
Plying Fortresses had killed seven U-boats at Bremen and one at Hamburg.
During Phase Two, the number of U-boats sunk during the war or for
certain periods of the war, was released more often. Vice Marshal A. B.
Elwood, RAFC Coastal Command, stated on September 3, 1943, that between
29
May and August, 1942, thirty U-boats a month had been killed. A
statement was Issued on June 30, 1943, by Mr* Malcolm Macj&cnald, British
High Commissioner In Canada. He stated that the total number of U-boats
sunk came to one a day. It can be seen that reports on the progress of
Allied successes against the U-boat followed the policy statements on
Phase Two.
The motivation behind the United States adopting a no-information
26. "Mr. Churchill on Casablanca Decisions," The London Times .
49, 468, (Feb. 12, 1943), p. 5.
27. "5 U-Boate in 10 Days," The London Times , 49, 559, (May 31, 1943). p. 4
28. "Eight U-Boats Sunk by Bombers,1' The London Times . 50, 105,
(April 1, 1945), p. 1.
29. " 90 U-Boats in May, June, and July," The London Times . 49, 645*
(Sept. 8, 1943), p. 3.
policy for Phase One was twofold. One reason vm to maintain alienee
in order to desl a blow to Nasi morale. Thia reason vaa baaed upon tb«
ballef that tba enemy not knowing about the fate of non-returning 0-boats,
would grow fearful. Therefore thia apprehension of not returning would
make the U-boat eerviss Increasingly unpopular. The aeeond reason vn
a military one. President Roosevelt in January, 1942, most aptly
deseribed the military viewpoint. "It would invite everyone to inspect a
map showing the location of United States Naval vessels." 30 Thus, the
American policy decision was motivated by a military and a psychological
concern.
With the success of the U-boats and the building by Germany of
twenty or thirty submarines a month, this strict censorship of leases
was questioned. The Navy on Mareh 4, 1942, recognising the fact that
the American public was getting a picture of merchant losses without
any U-boat sinkings, considered issuing the news of victories faster.31
This policy of no information because of military and psychological
concerna by no mean* escaped without criticism or discontent. The
discontent centered around the lop-sided attacks by U-boats on merchant
shlpa. Should these attacks go unreported? At Trenton, New Jersey, on
February 9, 1942, 125 delegates to the New Jersey Press Convention
criticised the Navy for its "no news" policy.32
The reasons for the shift in emphasis in Phase Two was the use of
the wolfpack by the Germans. By the use of many U-boata in operation
30. "Navy Strikea 'Strong Blows'", BE, XCI, 30, 6?8, (Jan. 21, 1942), p. 5.
31. News of Victories May Be Sped by Navy," The New York Tirnep
.
XCI,
30, 720, (March A, 1942), p. 3.
32. "Navy Report Criticised," The New York Times , XCI, 30, 698,
(Feb. 10, 1942), p. 13.
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against a convoy, the loaa of on* U-boat would be known to the other
embers of the wolfpeck. This information would be relayed to Lorient,
France, Therefore, the waiting for an overdue U-boat would be cancelled.
Other reasons would include partial Allied suooese and the British policy
on war information. In The, New fork Times on March 19, 1943, it was
reported that the Britiah had a decided effect on the American change in
33
policy.
The motivation for the policy formulated in Phaae Two waa to give
the public information which stressed Allied sucoeases. This could be the
reason why the ruling forbidding the releaae of the namea of sunken
merchant vessels or naval mita waa kept, during this period. This
secrecy waa criticised by c olumnlat Edwin L. James, who charged that
this policy left the public puisled. He insinuated tbst public opinion
became confused when the Truman report of March, 1943, atated that
merchant ship losses totalled 1,000,000 tons a month. Secretary Knox
disputed these figures in March, 1943, stating that this figure referred
to the total loss in gross tons for the year 1942. Edwin L. James also
pointed out that the confusion as to merehantahip loaaea waa further
aided by Nasi propaganda.3* Thus, if the merchant losses were not pub-
lished, the publio would remain confuaed and Nasi propaganda would have
a better opportunity to take hold. By relying on the publication of
American success, the Navy waa attempting to play down merohant loaaes.
The Britiah reasoning on their policy in Phaae One followed the
American reasoning cloaely. However, one of the major reasons for
33.~"U-Bost Curb Eased/ Ths New York Times . XCII, 31, 100, (March 19,
1942), p. 13.
34. James, E. L., " Seoreay on Ship Losses Leaves Public Pussled,"
The New York Times . XCII, 31, 107, (March 25, 1943), Sec. IV E, p. 37.
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British alienee vn a Military on«. Thia nathod vaa Intended to delay a
new U-boat from replacing tha loat ones.3* In othar words, by ramalnlng
eilent, it would take tha Germane longer to discover that a U-boat had
been loat, and to replace it with another ona. Thia essentially vaa
tha motivation behind tha British policy in Phase Ona.
Tha British changed tha empheaia of their policy for the same reasons
as the Americans . The British found there wea a need to keep up public
Interest and encouragement
. Thus, because of the need for encouragement,
and the German use of the wolfpeek, tha policy was changed*
British motivation in the second phase waa aptly summed up by Mr.
Erendsn Braoken, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The principle should
be the? speediest possible release of all communiquea dealing with opera-
tional newr* with an even balance between press and radio. Behind theaa
statements is the fact that the Britiah wished to concentrate on the German
losses.
The Allied merchant losses were primarily given in the Roosevelt-
Churchill announcements. These reports were initiated to help coordinate
the American-British news releaaea. Therefore, discrepancies and contra-
dictions were out down.
The results of these policies sen be seen in the picture that waa
presented to the public in Phase One, Phsse Two, at the end of the war
and In postwar estimates. In Phase One the public waa presented with
reports on the operetions of U-boata along the American coaat. For
35. "Victories," EE, *CI, 30, 681, (Jsn. 24, 1942), p. 2.
36. "Release of News," The London Times . 49, 845, (March 30, 1944), p. 2.
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example, on April 13, 1942. Hanaon Baldwin reported - Eight to tvelre
U-boat, off our Coaat/ focuaaing on Hattera..37 In „portB on
-ngage«nt., indication, were given that U-boat, vera being aunk. On
February 26, l*AJ, it waa reported that three U-boate were aunk and
four more damaged in the Weatern Atlantic.38 However, merchant
.hip
lo..e. accounted for a bulk of the reporting. On larch 31, 19*2, the
Awociated Pre., reported one hundred merchant
.hip. aunk, .inc. the
•tart of the war. It va. true that
.tatementa were made concerning
the action, againat the U-boat, but the predominant image la the operation
of U-boat, along the Coast and the auoceaa of theae U-boat, in .inking
merchantmen.
Pha.e Two brought the fulcrum to the opposite side. The public
wa. made aware of the U-boat losses, but little was .aid on merchant
loa.ee. Individual engageaenta and total .inking report, gave the appear-
ance of Allied auoaeaaea againat the U-boat. Merchant losses were
confined to the coordinated report, of Roosevelt and Churchill. Theae
report, alao indicated the U-boat loeaea.
At the end of the war, the public was preaented with a number of
reports on the success of American anti-eubmarine methods against the
U-boat. In All Hand.
, in June 1945, Admiral Jonaa H. Ingram, Commander-
in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, reported that the United States Navy had
definitely sunk 126 U-boate and probably more.39 Admiral Bellinger, Commander
of the Atlantic Fleet Air Arm atated that Si of the 126 U-boata were
aunk from the air. On June 11, 1945, The New York Time, atated that
37. Baldwin, H. V., "Air Power In the War, III/ Th« flam r™* T>«,
»%, 30, 760 (April 13, 1942), p. 4.
38. " 56 Enemy Shipa Sunk By Cur Navy/ The New York Tiae? f XCI, 30, 714,
(Feb. 26, 1942), p. It
39. Ingram, J. H., 'All Hands," in the Naval Inatltute Proa—din™ .
Anaapolia, 1945, Vol. 71, p. 856.
rev^nga ,
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U-boat losses were aat at 713 with 151 being credited to United States
forces/0 The Hew York Herald Tribune gave 151 to the United States and
Allied forces under American control. The British Empire was credited
with 4.62, while 100 were destroyed by other causes. These figures do
not include U-505, which was captured by American forces on April 6, 1944
At the end of the war the generally accepted reeult was 151 U-boats for
the United States forces. This result appeared in The Kw York Tlm»m nnri
New York Herald Tribune .
The extent of German submarine losses hss been debated for years after
the war. This debate hss led to a number of different estimates of the
German losses. Admiral King in his report, United States Navy at Way , in
1946, states that nine U-boats were sunk in 1939, twenty-two in 1940,
thirty-five in 1941, eighty-five in 1942, one hundred thirty seven in
1943, two hundred and forty one in 1944, and one hundred and fifty three
42
in 1945. The total is 682 U-boats. Dudley Knox, author of A History
of the United States Naw . in 1948 oredits the British with 561 U-boats.
The United States Is credited with 177 U-boats. Another sixteen U-boats
were credited to both the United States and Greet Britain, because of
joint action. To these 177 U-boats another 62 could be added, because
of United States Amy Air Force bombing raids In the interior of Germany.
Another fourteen U-boats were attributed to French, Dutch, Norwegian, and
Csech units J** No mention was made of the accomplishments of the Royal
Canadian Navy.
407~" U-Boat Losses Set at 713," The Hew York Tlmea. XCIV, 31, 915, (June
11, 1945), p. 3.
41. "713 U-Boats Sunk," in the N*y«l institute Proceedings . Annapolis,
1945, Vol. 71, p. 871.
42. Kine, USN at War , p. 206.
43. Knox, Hlatorv of the United States Hwy . New York, 1948, p. 529.
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Prime Minister Churchill attributed to the Allies credit for sinking
780 U-boets out of 781 German and 85 Italian submarines . Tae British
accounted for 524. The United States was credited with 174. Eighty-two
U-bosts were sunk because of other nationalities or unknown causes.^
In 1946, the United States published the Yellow Book/ entitled
German f Japanese, and Italian Submarine Losses in World War II. This
publication gave the loss of German U-boats as 781 vessels. This evalua-
tion was made by the Chief of Naval Operations Ccaemittee on Damage to
Enemy Submarines, and Its British counterpart, The British Admiralty
Assessment Commission. When this figure, 781, is broken down, the British
were given e finsl total of 411 U-boats destroyed. The United States Armed
Forces received a totsl of 166, while the Canadians and Austrslisns
z.6
aocounted for forty and twelve U-bosts respectively. The claims of
the four Allies totaled 629 German submarines.
In 1955, the Naval Historical Division published a United States Naval
Chronology. World War II . This work listed the contributions of the
United States to the anti-aubaarine war. This contribution amounted to
170 U-boats. This figure was broken down into actions in various sones
of operations, like the Caribbean, South America, United States Coast,
English Coast, Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean. In the Caribbean,
American forces aocounted for twenty U-boats. Off the United States
Coset and off the English Coast the count was six and eight U-boats
respectively. In the Mediterranean, American foroea accounted for eight
44. Churchill, W. S., My Finest Hour. Boston, 1949, p. 6.
45. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. Appendix 1.
46. German. Japenesa. and jjjgai fr'W 1 "* Loammm Vftl11 - Annapolis, Md.,
1946, p. 1.
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U-boata. In the Atlantic, the largest and busiest operational zone,
the count rose to seventy-four U-boats. Another forty-two were destroyed
by bombing raids by United States Army Air Forces/7 Thus, the total
of U-boats destroyed amounted to 170.
Although the true picture could not be given until after the war,
controversy as to the proper figure on U-boat losses still continues.
This figure has fluctuated between 126 U-boats and 174. During the war,
the public was not told the number of U-boats sunk. Now, after the war
the public cannot help being confuaed by the range of figures brought
before it. What was the real accomplishment of the United States forces
against the U-boat? And why do the discrepancies trested above exist?
IP. Naval Air Bombingi have been included under the 170 U-boats.
V. THE NUMBER OP D-BQATS ACTUALLY SUNK
" 'We, an Island Power, ., ..dependent on the
sea, can read the lessen and understand
our own fate had we failed to master the
U-bo«ts.»" 1
- Winston S. Churchill
The difficulty in accurately determining the number of U-boats
sunk by United States Forces is suggested from the Tarying figures
published in American successes. This difficulty arises out of the
problem of when s U-boat was sunk and by whom. There are four reasons
for these varying figures. The first involves the inaccuracy of reports
by esoort vessels and aircraft of the United States. The second occurs
because some operations against U-boats wears carried out by escort craft
of two different nationalities. Who should receive credit for the kill?
Per example, when British A ir Squadron 224 teamed with the United States
Army A/S 4 Squadron to sink U-4G4 on July 28, 1943, the credit for the
2
sinking was given to both nationalities. The third reason is the
placing of foross of one nationality under control of another nationality.
It was decided at the Atlantic Convoy Conference on March 1, 1943, that
the United States would place an escort carrier and five destroyers
3
under British control for convoy duty in the North Atlantic. When
this group sunk s U-boat, did the United States or Great Britain receive
tivi er-,.:-':'-" The feur-Ui problem eris«fs from the joint frsslslSf, attacks
on German posts by the United States Army Air Forces and the Royal Air
1. Roakill. War At Sea . Ill, p. 37.
2. United Statea Naval Chronology World War II . Waahington, 1954, p. 57.
3. Roakill, War At Sea . II, p. 211
Forcea . Whoae bombs accounted for the destroyed U-boats? Therefore,
the aifficulty in eolvlng theee problem, with the eddou problem of
complete error* ( leada to the Tarying figures oa U-boat leases J*
Here the German aata on looses suffarect Is of greet aaaiatanee in
minimising error. Of 1,111 U-boats commissioned during the war, the
German Navy lost 817 U-boate. Admiral Doenit* speculates that out of
these 817, 753 were destroyed,vails others were damaged or surrendered,,
The German breakdown includes 603 lost by naval action. Sixty-two were
lost because of unknown causes, while seven were lost through accidents/
Besides the 603 lost U-boats, eighty-one U-boats were sunk by Allied
bombing attacks in port or by mines. However, s statistical breakdown
on sinkings by the different nationalities is lacking.
Erio Groner in 195A, attempts to give a more deteiled record of
the German losses, by consulting the German records. He indicates that
101 U-boata were destroysd by United States forces. His work,
m fr ftt*f^~l6**mim-*am *»f*&*m MW-ian. did not
always distinguish the nationality of the attacking vessel or aircraft.
This is particularly true of aircraft. Therefore, the description ss to
how s particular U-boat waa sunk, often leaves the identity of the
attacking aircraft or veasel unrepealed. Par example, the listing of
0-682 reads " 31. 3. L5 Hamburg / Fli-Bo,"
7
meaning that on March 31,
1945, U-682 was sunk by s plane at Hamburg. An example of where
all
8
data Is known is • 0-629 8.6. U* Kanal V. Brsst / Brit. Fli-Bo."
This notation indicates that U-629 wss sunk in the Channel west of Brest
by British aircraft on June 8, 19U. Therefore, it can be seen that the
5. Haam
f
Per Seekries. p. 37
6. Doenits, Ten Years . Appendix 6.
7. Gr&ner, Die Sehiffe, p. 55
8. Ibid., p. 54.
the number 101 is almost certainly not complete and that only the
comparison of all svsilsble data will provide a reasonably accurate
result
•
In order to sol»e the problems cf sinkings involvine different
nstionalities, of combined bombing attacks , end units under British
control, certain rules oust be established. All U-boats sank, by units
consisting of more than one nationality, will be credited to the com-
bined netlonalitiea. Neither nationality will reoeive individual credit.
Both the United States and Great Britain would therefore reoeive credit
for 17-404. This decision rests on the premise that it is Impossible
to distinguish who actually sunk the U-boat. Similarly, when U-boats
are sunk during a combined strategic bombing attack by the United States
Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force, credit will be given both, with
no individual credit. When United States vessels and aircraft were
operating under British control, the oredit for any U-boat sinkings
would go to the British and vice versa.
In order to achieve aoeuracy and to substantiate the number of U-boats
sunk by Unitsd States Forces, four sources were consulted. United States
publications, United States Naval Chronology W g, and German. Japaneae.
and Italian Submarine Losses in WW II . gave the American aide. On the
German side, Pit Sphjfft Per Deuteohea Erlefiamarlne Und Luftwaffe 1939-194?
provides valuable information. The War at Sea , by Captain S. W. Roskill,
is' used as s confirmation report. To help define the area in which the
last operations of the U-boat were taking place, the U-boat's previous
actions are also helpful. Therefore, with the various presumptions and
the attempt to cross cheek, an accurate representation of the success of
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American operations against the U-boat can be obtained.
In tha final analysis, the figure decided upon to represent the
contribution of the United States Armed Forcea in the anti-submarine
war was narrowed down to U8 oonfiraed U-boata. Twenty U-boats were
credited to United States Forcea acting in cooperation with another
country. Of these twenty U-boata, eleven were killed in operation* at
see, while nine sinkings occur r«id during boabing raids.
To sake it easier to organise and to atudy where theee U3 G-boata
were sunk, various areas will be marked out. These area boundaries are
necessary to facilitate the handling of the material ana aleo to provide
an examination of the success of United States Forces in these various
areas. These areaa include the Atlantic and its surrounding entities, such
as the Caribbean, North Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. Specifically, these
sonea include the American Coast Line, Middle America, the South American
Coast, Atlantic Group A, Atlantic Group B, the European Coast, and the
Mediterranean Sea. Two German U-boats that were sunk outside of the
areas of inspection have not been included in the total. These oraft,
0-537 and U-183, were sunk in the Java Sea.9 All the remaining U-boats
discussed will be found in the operational sonea specified.
The first sons is that of the American Coast Line. The boundary
runs from Northern Newfoundland to approximately Northern New Jersey.





The question is raised as to the number of U~bcats aunk in
9. Ibid ., pp. AB and 53.
10. See Chsr< #1.
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The actual number of confirmed sinkings within this sone ie rather
small considering the number of merchant ships engaged there by the enemy
early in the war. The total comes to six U-boats. Four of these six
were sunk by escort vessels and two by attacks from the air. In 1943, only
one U-boat, U-174, was sunk. This occurred on April 27, by Aircraft VB-125.
Not until 1944 was another U-boat sunk in this sone of operations. Two
U-boats were then accounted for, 0-233, by the USS Baker and USS Thomas .
and U-1229, by Aircraft VC-42. In 1945 three U-boats were sunk, all by
surface craft. U-866 was aoeountcd for by the USS Lowe . USS Monger .
USS Pride , and USS Reuben Jones . On May 6, 1945, the USS Atherton and
the USS Mobarlv killed U-853.1LIt oan readily be seen that the American
coast line was not a major battle ground. In fact, the greatest successes
occurred when the U-boat battle was waning, in 1945.
The Middle American sone included the lower part of the United States
coast and the Caribbean. The Middle American sone extended along the coast
from Northern New Jersey to Florida, encompassing the Caribbean Sea and
the Gulf of Mexico. The specific boundary consists of 40°N by 60°tf by
10°N 60°W and extends as far vest as the Gulf of Mexico.
12
Unlike the
American coastal sone, the Middle American sone had a higher number of
sinkings
.
Fifteen U-boats were destroyed in this sone. Eight U-boats were
destroyed by aircraft, either land-baaed or oarrier-based. Five of the
vanquished U-boats were sunk by sea vessels, while two were destroyed by
a combined attack by air and sea forces. In 1942, nine submarines were
sunk. July was the largest month with three submarines destroyed. One, U701,
11. See Appendix 3






was deetroyed by alp, while the other two ware destroyed by an air/sea
combination. These two U-boats were U-153 and U-576. In 1943, fire
U-boata were never to return hone. July was the moat eventful month with
three U-boats killed. VF-32, a Naral Eand-fi nsed airoraft aank U-759,
U-159, and U-359. In 1944, the only accountable aoticn was the sinking
of U-550 by US? Grandy, U3S Joice . and U58 Peterson .13 The major battle
here waa fought in 1942 and 1943. Few sinkings occur after 1943. which
would leave the author to believe that the U-boats switched to other areas.
The aotlon off the South American coast was similar to the Kiddle
American sons. The geographic boundary of this sone follows the South
American coast. This boundary ranges out into the Atlantic from 10°N
30°W to 10°S 30°W. A^ However, the author has not accurately kept the
boundary, with regard to 10°N. The author has ohaaged this, when it was
felt that the sinking waa closer to the South American oosst, and
therefore, warrants being included in this sone. This violation accounted
for the U-boats U-548, U-572, and U-1062.
In this sone, including the three violations, twelve U-boats were
sunk. Nine were credited to aircraft, while three were the result of
action by sea craft. In 1942;, only U-512 was killed, accounted for by
United States Army Airoraft 99, on November 2, 1942. In 1943, a total
of nine were sunk. In May, 1943, U-128 was destroyed by USS Moffett .
USS Jduett . snd VP-74, Nevy Land-Bssed Air. This U-boat was sunk on
May 17, 1943, not May 28, 1943.
15 July 1943,was again a large month,
with five U-boata being sunk. These U-bosts were all accounted for by
United Statea aircraft.
16
In 1944, U-106 waa destroyed by the USS Frcssendan,
UI 3ee Appendix 4.
14. See Chart #3.
15. U.S. Naval Chronology, p. 50.
16. See Appendix 5*
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and ia 1945, U-548 by the USS Coffman . USS Boatwiok. and USS Thomas .17
The owell picture shows ths intensity of ths battls in 1943, with
the increased destruction of D-boats in July of 1943.
The Atlantic sone includes the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and
18the African Coast Line. In order to arrive at the best possible
discussion ©f the Atlantic battle, two distinct areas have been foranlated.
The line of demarcation is the longitudinal line 30°W. Group A consists
of all sunk U-boats west of 30°W, while Group B consists of all U-boats
sunk east of 30°W.
19
Thirty-two U-boats wsre sunk in Area A. Eight were sunk by sea
craft, while twenty-two were sunk by aircraft. U-801 and U-66 were sunk
by the combined air and see units. In 1942 s only one U-boat, U-503, was
killed. In 1943, the number rose to sixteen. In the first five months,
20from January to May, only five U-boats were destroyed. Two came in
March, two in May and one in April. In June, July, and August, twelve
U-boats were destroyed, with August accounting for six. There is some
question as to whether U-84 and U-185 were killed on the 24th or 30th
of August. From September to December five U-boats were sunk, one in
September, two in October, end two in November. In 1944, six were sunk,
with four being destroyed in the first four months of the year. In
1945, five U-boats went to the bottom. Of the total, thirty-two, the
year 1943 accounted for half, with August being the big month, with six
U-boats sunk.
In Area B, east of the demarcation line, 30°W,
21 forty-five U-boats
were engaged and destroyed by United States Forces. Of thsse forty-five,
vF. See Appendix 5.
18. See Chart #4*
19. See Chart #4.
20. See Appendix 6.
21. See Chart #4.

twelve were sunk by sea craft, and twenty-nine sunk by aircraft, while
four were destroyed in a combined effort. One of these four, U-6Q4, was
scuttled after being attacked by the USS Moffctfr and VP-129, a Navel
22
Land-Based Aircraft.
In 1942, six submarines were sunk. All were in the latter part of
the year, except for 0-519, which was destroyed on February 10, 1942.
In 1943, there were twenty-seven sinkings. In the first four months




and July, there were fifteen sinkings. July had eight of then. In
the remaining months, ten were accounted for by United States Forces.
The number of submarine sinkings diminished in 1944, ten being sunk,
with five of these in the first four months. Five more were added in
the next three months. In 1945, only one U-boat was destroyed, 0-248,
by the combined actions of USS Barter . USS (Otter. 03S Varian . and USS Hubbard .
The results show a slow rate of sinkings in 1942, with a concentrated
effort in July and August, 1943.
Off the English and European coast damage to the enemy U-boats by
United States forces was slight. This operational zone included the
coast of Europe and Great Britain, the English Channel, North Sea, Bay
of Biscay, and the Baltic Sea. Specifically, the area ranged from
60°N 10°W to 40°N 10°W, excluding the Mediterranean Sea and its approaches,
particularly between Spain and Africa.
The operations in this sons accounted for three U-boats by American
forces. All three were destroyed from the sir. On November 12, 1943,
U-508 was sunk by VB-102, a Navy Land-Based plane. The other two sinkings
22. U.S. Naval Chronology , p. 59.
23. See Appendix 7.
24. See Chart #5.
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occurred in 1945 on the 25th and 30th of April, accounting for U-1007 and
U-1055. The American forces did not play a major role in this sone
of operations.
The Mediterranean zone achieved results which were even less im-
pressive than those of the European sone. This aone consisted of the
Mediterranean Sea and its passages, from 30°N 0°W, 45°N 0°W to 43°W
45°H, 43°E, 30°N.
26
Of the two U-boats sunk in this area, both were sunk
by sea craft. U-375 was sunk on July 30, 1943 by the USS PC-624., while
U-73 was killed on December 16, 1943, by the USS Woolsev and USS Trlppe .27
Although the Mediterranean and European coastal waters did not produce
very large results, the United States Army Air Force bombings on harbors
and the approaches produced better results.
Thirty-three U-boats were lost because of attacks by the United States
Army Air Forces. These attacks were largely carried out against Pola,
Toulon, Salamis, Bremen, Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and Trondheim.
28
In 1943 only one U-boat was destroyed in port. In 1944, thirteen
U-boats became the victims of the bombings with seven sunk at Toulon
from February 6, 1844, to August 6, 1944. This date of February 6 is
29
questionable since U-380 could have been hit on March 11, 1944. In
1945, nineteen U-boats were sunk between February 24, 1945, and April 4,
1945. Kiel was hit the hardest, losing ten U-boats. Wilhelmshaven lost
three and Bremen five, in this same period. Therefore, the total number
of U-boats sunk by bombing, thirty-three, brings the complete total of
U-boats sunk by American forces to 148.
25~. See Appendix 8a.
26. See Chart #6
27. See Appendix 8b.
28. See Appendix 9.
29. U. S. Naval Chronology , p. 80.
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On* other U-boat oust be mentioned. U-505 was oaptured on April 6,
by the t»SS Guadalcanal, a baby flattop, in eonjunotion with the
deatroyer PSS Plllaburv?0 Thla U-boat cannot be recorded as destroyed
but rather vaa plaeed in the possession of United Statea Forces.
Six U-boats have been reported as sunk by United Statea Forces, but
hare also been recorded as sunk by other nationalities* U-588 vaa
credited to the Canadian Tassels, WctaakicTcn . and Skcenc .31 While U-761
and U-392 vere accounted for by the British. The British also sunk U-186,
U-2323 atruck s Bins on July 29, 1944, and destroyed itself.32 Therefore,
these destroyed U-boats cannot be credited to the American total.
Aircraft appears to have played a predominant role in the destruction
of U-boats. Of the totsl 14.8, bombing missions accounted for thirty-
three. This leaves 115 U-boats that were sunk by air and sea forces at
see. Aircraft accounted for seventy-four of these U-boats, while sea
craft accounted for thirty-four. Air/sea attacks destroyed eight U-boata.
Aircraft, therefore, accounted for 63.5% of thoae U-boats sunk at sea.
Thus, the predominant part played by the airplane can be seen.
30. See Appendix 10.
31. Groner, Pie Sohlffe, p. 52
32. Ibid., p. 54.
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VI. CONCLUSION
" 'There mist be a beginning of any
great matter, but the continuing unto
the end until it be thoroughly ,
finished yields the true <rlory. ,n
-Sir Francis Drake to Lord Walsingham.
17th May, 1587.
The U-boat was defeated by May, 1944- The U-boat had been driven from
the Atlantic Ocean and its approaches. The U-boats had lost the offensive
in May, 1943, because of American improvements on weapons and location
devices. Even improvements like the schnorkel could not overcome the
American scientific advances. The U-boats were forced to fight a
delaying action until newer U-boats became available. They came too late
to save the German naval effort. Part of the defeat could be attributed
to German U-boat policy.
German U-boats attempted to sink as many merchant ships as possible,
regardless of cargo. On April 11, 1943, Admiral Doenitz described
the pitfalls of this policy. "The submarine war will be a failure if
2
we don't sink more ships than the enemy is able to build.11 By March, 1943,
3
the Germans had more U-boats (110) in the Atlantic than ever before.
Yet, May, 1943 -, brought increased U-boat sinkings. Admiral Doenits
had underestimated the capacity of the United States to build escorts
and devise detection instruments. The U-boats were discovered and
destroyed. American successes were possible because of new weapons,
escort craft, and location devices.
The number of sinkings might have been higher if the United States
had not placed so much stress on certain policies. At the Casablanca
Conference in 1943, the objectives included the bombing of factories in
1. Roeklll. War at Sea . Ill II, p. 251.
2. Morison, Bsttle of the Atlantic , p. 401,
3. Ibid ., p. 407.
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Europe, the plants In whloh U-boats w«re assembled, and the bases
at Brest and Lorient.
It can be seen from the bombing statistics that the bombing of
shipyards did not affect production greatly/ When questioned at
Nureaburg, Albert Speer, former Reich Minister of Armament and War Pro-
duction, testified that production in the yards was reduced about ten
percent. By bombing the electrical industry, the Allies hoped that motor
bstteries would be kept from the U-bosts. Although the accumulator
battery factories at Posen, Vienna, and Hasan vera damaged, the most
important one st Hanover was never touched.^ Production continued to
meet the needs. Thus, if the Allies had chosen more appropriate targets,
the U-boat damage by bombing probably would have been greater.
The damage done to the submarine pens such as Lorient and Brest
was slight. The bombing of the submarine pens during the war inflicted
little damage with only one bomb ever penetrating the Brest pen/ Therefore,
it seems safe to conclude that the stress placed upon this operation could
have been better used elsewhere. More stress might have proved profitable
in hunter-killer groups, tracking st sea, attacks on U-bosts in transit,
or more suitable bombing targets.
In sinking 1A8 U-boats, the United States illustrated the predominant
use of aircraft as a weapon against the U-boat. Aircraft, land-baaed or
carrier-based, sank 63.5 percent of those U-bosts sunk st see. Another
33 U-boats (out of IAS) were sunk by bombing missions. Undoubtedly,
aircraft played an Important role in defeating the U-boat.
In order to make the airplane effective, the invention of deteotion
A. See Appendix 3.
5. Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy . Washington, 19A6,
III, p. 275. Hereafter cited as Strategic Bombing . III.
6. Roskill, War at See . II, p. 352.
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device* was necessary. The German Combsrider of U-boate, Admiral Doenlts,
stated that, "The equipment of radar next to the atomic bomb, was the
deciaive war-winnina: invention." Another device which was helpful waa
the Magnetic Airborne Detector, but this instrument came out in 1944, after
the main battle hed been won. Along with radar, the planes proved effective
because of their scoring punch. The sddition of the torpex depth charges
and rockets anabled aircraft to take their toll.
The U-boat campaign was a challenge to the American people and the
United Statea Navy. The Navy had to fight in two oceana. In the final
results, 143 U-boats were sunk. Although this figure seems small, the
defeat of the U-boat relied upon the patience and vigilance of the men
searching for these U-boats. The final defeat of the U-boat depended
upon the capacity of the United States to produce aircraft, merchant
vessels, and location devices, which the German economy could not match.
The newspapers attempted to keep up with the number of U-boat sinkings.
During the Phaae One period, the number of reported sinkings in The Sew
York Timea wee 29 U-boats destroyed by American forces. The number of
U-boets reported sunk by March, 1942, waa far in excess of the number
actually sunk. Therefore in Phaee One, the public was receiving an over-
3
estimation of American successes
.
In Phaee Two, The New York Times reporta were considerably below the
actual sinkings. Prom the period beginning June, 1943, end ending Msreh,
1944, this wss generally true. The high number of sinkings in September,
1944, could be explained by the feet that press releases on U-boat losses
were e few month* behind. The public, therefore, rarely received accurate
or up-to-date information on the U-boat war. It can be said that the
summery of ths results, 151 U-bosts sunk, wss very cloee to being accurate.
7. Nurembure . XIII, p. 279.
3. See Graph #1.
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Tfn Ft* iTrtli TlBftf attempted to keep the public inforaed about
United Stetee merchant ship loeaea. There were uaually two types of
preaa releaaea concerning the number of merchantmen eunk. One waa an
unofficial Associated Preaa eatimetion and the other waa the official Naval
report. The reporting of merchant ahip loaaea waa moat prevalent during
Phaae One. In Phase One, both the official end unofficial reporta were
far below the actual number of ainkinga. The exception occurred from
September, 1942, to January, 1943, when the Aaaocieted Preaa estimate
waa far in exoesa of the correct number . Thua, it can be aeen that the
public waa net being well inforaed on U-boat successes. There aeeas to
have been an attempt by the Government to misinform the public on the
course of the U-boat war. It la improbable that the discrepancies
between reports and reslities were the result of honest error.
The motivation behind the United States public information policy
was primarily a military concern. The authorities felt that the various
sctions could not be publicised because it would allow the enemy to
pinpoint United States navsl vessels.10 The description would also
tsll the enemy when e U-boat was sunk. It is Improbable that the war
effort could have been affected by the description of anti-submarine
setleas.
In Phsse One, little news wes released on U-boats sunk by United
States craft. Information could have been piven without indicating
the piece or the names of the unite involved. In Phaae Two, information
waa given, but it was uaually several months behind the engegeaent. The
use of the wolfpeek by the enemy enabled the Gerasns to have information
on any U-boat sinkings and United States naval unite. Therefore, informa-
could have been given to the public without seriously impairing the war effort.
9. See Graph
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5 torpedo tubes (AB1H)
1-8.8 flak
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2150 *3 19,2 knots
6.9
I 2710 ,3 16.4 knots
II 4650 *3 23.0 knots
7.0
] ' 1 2300 »3 14 .4 knots
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16.0
XVTII 1887 si3 15.5 knots
24.0
XXI 21U 15.5 knots
17.5
6 torpedo tubes (4,2)
1-10.5 flak
1-3.7 flak
1-2 fink, 22 mines
ss of 1942
k 2 y. ..
1-3.7 flsk
XX] XI 274 mJ 9.7 knots
12.5
2 torpedo tubes (2H), 66 nines
1-3.7 flak, 4-2 flak
8 torpedo tubes (6,28)
4-12.72







6 torpedo tubes (6&)
4-3 flakj
6 torpedo tubes (6b)
4-2 flak2 , 12 mines
4-3 flls,l2» (Vorgesehen)
2 torpedo tubes (2B)
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APPENDIX 3
EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON LATE MODEL GERMAN U-BOAT
PRODUCTIONS AND OPERATIONS1
(of Bombing Alone)
I. U*Boat Types Type XXI Type XXIII
A. Production
1. Number ordered (by end of war) 381 95
2. Number produced (by end of war) 2 202 13
3. Number denied (by bombing attaok) 60 19
4. Number actually delivered 119 63
B. After Commission
1. Sunk by bombing 15 8
2. Still in training 91 38
3. Number not full operational 12 17
U. Number in Full operation 6
1. Webster, C, and Frankland, W., Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany,
1939-19A5 . London, 1961, Vol. 17, p. 276.
2. The number produced was affected by priorities, reallocation of materials,
and manpower.
APPBNDK 4
U-BOATS SUNK OFF THE UNITED STATES COAST BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FRCM 50°N 50°W to 40°N 50°y
U-Boat Pete Sunk Sunk By










U-1229 August 20, 19U VC-42 (USS Bogue ) 42
U20«N
51°39»W
U-866 Maroh 11, 1945 USS Love, USS Mender 43°13«N
6l°08'W
U-879 April 19, 1945 USS Buckley . USS Reuben Jones 42°19«n
61°45'W
U-S53 May 6, 1945 USS Atberton . USS Hoberly 41°13«J5
71°27«W
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U-BOATS SUNK IN MIDDLE AMERICAN ZONE BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM 40°N 60°W to 10°N 60°W
U-Boat
5 April U, 1942
U-352 May 9, 1942
U-157 June 13, 1942
U-158 Juna 30, 1942
U-701 July 7, 1942
U-153 July 13, 1942
U-576 July 15, 1942
U-166 August 1, 1942
U-654 August 22, 1942
U-521 Juna 2, 1943
U-159 July 15, 1943
U-759 July 26, 1943
U-359 July 28
U-615 August 6, 1943








VS-9 and US Unicoi1









































U-BQATS SUNK OFF SOOTH AMERICA BY TOUTED STATES FORCES














Date Sunk Sunk By
October 2, 1942 TJSAil-99
January 6, 1943 VP-83














August 3, 1943 VP-205
September 27, 1943 T7F-74
Sentember 30, 1944 Ml Freaaention



























U-BOATS SUNK IN THE ATLANTIC IN AREA A
WEST OF LONGITUDE 30°W
BUtJtedi
U-503 Maroh 15 s 1942 VP-82 45*50«N
*»u *e
U-130 March 12, 1943 USB ChaaaHn 37*10* N
w ft
U-175 April 17, 1943 48*50* N
U-657 May U, 1943 VP-84 60*10* N
U-569 May 22, 1943 VC-9 (UBS Boaue) 50*40'
N
U-217 Juna 5, 1943 VC-9 (USB Bogue.) 30*18' N
i2 40' V
U-113 June 6, 1943 VC-9 (USS Bom ) 30*49'
U-388 June 20, 1943 VP-84 (USS §oguf) 57*36'
U-487 July 13, 1943 VC-13 (USS, Cora) 27*15*
3/°lgi yA.U If
U-67 July 16, 1943 vc-13 (usg port) 30*05'
IAT.7'¥
U-A3 July 30, 1943 VC-29(|1SS San>e) 34*57*11
34 11« W
U-117 August 7, 1943 VF-205, VP-204, VP-130,
Cm Card) 4 US Boriber 10
39*33N
38°21'W
U-664 August 9, 1943 VC-1 (USS. Cari) 40*12' 1
37 29'
w
U-525 Auguat Ut 1943 VC-1 (OSS Card) 41*29*
H
38 55'W
U-84 August 26, or 24, 1943 VC-13 (USS Cora) 27*09*
N
37°03*W
U-185 Auguat 26, or 24, 1943 VC-13 (USB Cora) 27*00* N
37*06*W
U-847 Auguat 27, 1943 VC-1 (U3S Zied) 28*19' N
37*58*
W






3fonk 3y Laaatieft tad
vp ~o /nan r*ma \ 4°. 14*
31 55'W
0-2.0*5 Novubar 1, 1943 ' Borle (Plane ?)
31
tU?W
Norenber 20, 1943 VC-19 (m gogot?
January 17, 19U vc-13 (HM(^M)
3 20'W
U-801 March 16. or 17.19AA VC-6 (OSS Bleak Island)
"ft? Pom* VP? BfTOffltilP. 30°28'V
March 19. 1944 VC-6 (USS Bloak laland) 13°10» M
33°44'W













U-1235 April 15, 1945 791 ^ffltw. SSfiLfiEfili 47*53'
«
30°26'V
U-518 April 22, 1945 03S Career, m feal A. lastt 43*26'*
38°23'W
n-546 April 24, 1945 USS Flaherty, USS Neunger





0-881 May 6, 1945 BH taaatm 43*18»
47*44'
W




U-BOATS SUNK IN THE ATLANTIC IN AREA B
EAST OT LONGITUDE 30°W
U-Boat Data Sunk f.m-ii; iv liUvCI vAUll tfUHft
U-464 August 20, 1942 VP-73 61°21«NnH 40»W




U-173 November 16, 1942 USS Woolaey.
USS Swanson. USS Quick
33*40'
07°35'W
U-611 December 10, 1942 VP-84 58 00* N
22W44'W
U-626 December 15, 1942 USCG Ingham i<-
'
27°12'W
U-519 February 10, 1943 USA Squad 2 47*05*1
16*34'
U-225 February 21, 1943 USCG Sneneer 51*25*
27 28'
U-156 March 8, 1943 VP-53 Mid-Atlantic
U-524 March 22, 1943 USA-1 30*15'
18°13»W
U-182 May 15 or 16, 1943 USS Meekenaie 33*55'
20*35'
U-467 May 25, 1943 VP-84 62*25*
U°52'W
U-200 June 24, 1943 VP-84 - >;>•
28*18'
USA A/S 1 37*40'
ALT
15 30»W
U-232 July 8, 1943 USA A/S 2 40*37'
13 U'W
U-506 July 12, 1943 USA A/S 1
16*30'W
U-160 July 14, 1943 VC-29 fUSS Santee) 33*54'
27*13'
U-509 July 15, 1943 7C-29 (USS Santee) 34*02'
26*02'




E ho Date Sunk OUAJL& DT
1 c B ,,
TJ-613 July 23, 1943 USS Badger 35°32«N
28 36'
W









U-336 October 4, 1943 VC-9 or VC-128 ? 43°18«N
October 4, 1943 VC-9 (USS Card) 43°18'N
<o 58'
U-402 October 13, 1943 VC-9 (USS Card) 48*56'
I
20 41"W
U-46O October 6, 1943 VC-9 (USS Card) 62°43«N
U-378 Octobsr 20, 1943 VC-13 (USS Core) 47^40'
N
U-848 November 5, 1943 VB-107, USA-1 10°09»S
18°00'W
U-849 November 25, 1943 VB-107 06o30«S
cs^o'w
ft rtrU-86 November 29, 1943 VC-19 (USS Bocue) 39°33'N
19 Ol'V





U-645 December 24. 19/
3
HM fla»Ve»—% NOT toll OX JUBOTW
U-271 v oflUoU T 40£ ' VB-103 53°15'N
15 52«tf
U Lit rooruary o* 1*744 VB-107 10°35'S
23°15'W
U-603 Msrch 1, 1944 USS Bronstsln. 48*55'
N
26°10«V
U-704 March 1, 1944 USS Thomas^ Broruit.4nZ00in»
w
26 OO'W
U-515 April 9, 1944 VC-58 (USS Guadalcanal) 3i°35«N
USS Fope„ USS Chatelan. 19 18»W
USS Flabsrty
APPENDIX 8 Cont.
U-Boat : ita ';..>•a Sunk By









/ us» waKerxeia <5 J4"a
21°36»W
TT 1C/U-154 July 3, 1944 USS Inch* & USS frost
19°30«W
U-ooO July 13, 1944 vc-9. vUSS Salmons.)
- %m '*mmt m
s5 • '•
05 30»W
U-248 January 16, 1945 USS Hayter. USS Otter.
USS Varisn. USS Hubbard
47°43»H
26°37'W
U-857 April 7, 1945 USS Gustarson 49°19»N
10°23'V
U-662 July 24, 1943 VP-94 03°36»N
27°56«W
U-467 May 25, 1943 VP-84 62°25'N
14°52'U
APPENDIX 9
A. U-BOATS SUNK OFF EUROPEAN COAST BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM 60°N 10°W to A0°N 10°W
S3tl3 Bti&JUfc SsffikjgX looatloa Sunk
U-503 Ncwaabcr 12, 1943 7I>-103 46°N
£77°30*W




D-1055 April 30, 1945 VPB-103 48°S
06°30'«
B. U-BOATS SUNK IN MHJUER&LcffiAN
-
SEA BY UNITED STATES FGRCB?
mm 0°tf 45°N to 0°« 30°U
IfcBfiit Ssm* By iaastiaa^fe
U-375 July 30, 1943 USS PC-624 36°40»N
12°28'E
U-73 D»o«tf»r 16, 1943 JSS WoylaT . 36*07' N
?2SJ*imS 00°50'W
APPENDIX 10
U-BOATS SUNK BY STRATEGIC BCMBING BY USAAF
Location Sunk
U-622 July 14. 1943 'J..'!';"* WUVMW4HS
U-81 January 9. 1944 Pola
U-380 February 6S 1944 or
March 11, 1944
Faulas
u-410 Fabrasry 6, 1944 or
Meroh 11, 1944
Toulon
U-421 April 29, 1944 Foulon
U-586 July 5, 1944 Toulon
U-872 July 29, 1944 -;/.:.,:; .
U-471 August 6, 1944 Toulon
U-642 July 5, 1944 or
August 6, 1944
Toulon
U--952 August 6, 1944 Toulon
U-969 August 6, 1944 Toulon
U-565 September 24, 1944 r,
U-596 September 24, 1944 ' :
TJ-3007 February 24, 1945 Bremen
U-2515 March 11, 1945 Hamburg
U-2530 March 11, 1945 Hamburg
U-96 March 30, 1945 Wllhelmehanren




l : > 1 :
U-3508 March 30, 1945 Wilnelmsheven
U-72 March 30, 1945
U-430 March 30, 1945 Bremen
U-329 March 30, 1945 mmm
U-870 March 30, 1945 Bremen
U-884 Maroh 30, 1945 Off Helling
U-2340 March 30, 1945 Hamfctorg
U-348 Maroh ?, 1945 ::-:\ :
U-1221 April 3, 1945 Kiel
APPENDIX 10 Cont
U-Boat Date Sunk
U-2542 April 3, 1945
U-3505 April 3, 1945
U-237 April 4, 1945
U-749 April 4» 1945










































US VC-95 & British 176 46°18«N
& 206 & Canadian
Prlnos Rupert
27°34'W
USS Pride . USS Campbell 37°49'N
it French Senegslsis & 05 39'E
British Blankner




USN #74 & Braslllan
sir
USN Bombing Squad.





USS Nielda . USS GleaTas .
USS Ellyaon . USS Hillsrr .
USS P. Jones . USS Maoomb
USS Hambleton. USS Rodman
USS Emmons & British air
UBS Fowler & Frenoh
d* Indlacret
Mid-i , Lsmiie
USS Niblaok . USS Ludlow Northwest
6 British sir Algiers
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